The ability to filibuster has long been an important tool for the United States Senate and some state legislative bodies. But some worry that it leads to unnecessary delay and a stop to productivity. Read on to learn about the development of the filibuster, its uses, and its abuses.

What is a filibuster?

In the Senate the general rule is that a Senator may speak for literally as long as he or she is physically able to do so.  When a Senator realizes that his or her position regarding a potential act of Congress is a minority one, the filibuster allows prolonging that debate indefinitely or using other dilatory tactics in order to prevent Congress from voting against that position.  Any bill can be subject to two potential filibusters. A filibuster on a motion to proceed to the bill’s consideration, and a filibuster on the bill itself. The typical practical effect of this tactic is that Congress will usually move on to other business for expediency’s sake if a filibuster is threatened on a controversial bill. Filibustering is generally very difficult if the proposed action is not controversial.

However, a filibuster in the U.S. Senate can be defeated by a procedure called cloture. Cloture allows the Senate to end a debate about a proposed action if three-fifths of available Senators concur.  After cloture has been initiated, debate on that bill continues for an additional thirty hours with the following restrictions:

• No more than thirty hours of debate may occur.
• No Senator may speak for more than one hour.
• No amendments may be moved unless they were filed on the day in between the presentation of the petition and the actual cloture vote.
• All amendments must be relevant to the debate.
• No other matters may be considered until the question upon which cloture was invoked is disposed of.

This process prevents filibustering from being used by a minimal number of Senators to obstruct bills that the vast majority of Congress wants to pass. However, cloture has drawbacks. It is difficult to implement because it often requires bipartisan support in order to get three-fifths of Senators to vote for it. It also takes time to implement because it must be ignored for a full day after it is presented. Finally, it requires a quorum call before voting so a large enough group of Senators can further delay voting by being absent so that a quorum is no longer present.

One of the most recent filibusters in the US Senate was conducted by Senator Rand Paul (R-KY):

Paul filibustered for nearly 13 hours, which is impressive. The longest Senate filibuster ever recorded was by Strom Thurmond, who filibustered for 24 hours and eighteen minutes.

What’s the argument for getting rid of filibusters?

Proponents of eliminating the Senate’s ability to filibuster argue that filibustering is childish and prevents proper resolution of disagreements about proposed bills. Filibustering allows belligerent legislators to seek acquiescence rather than compromise. When a filibuster is threatened, proponents of a bill may accept amendments to the bill that they do not favor in order to end debate. Even worse, double filibusters can make passing some bills much more time consuming. Moreover, filibusters can create dire consequences for bills that are proposed in time-sensitive circumstances e.g. when the fiscal budget is near expiration and voting is obstructed in order to advance policy interests.

What’s the argument for keeping the ability to filibuster?

Opponents of ending filibustering argue that the maneuver is necessary to preserve the fair representation and consideration of minority views. Without it, a simple majority could pass oppressive restrictions and hardship onto the minority and there would be no recourse against a duly passed law. The filibuster has been used to protect the rights of minorities in this country for a long time. The Senate was designed to ensure that the public’s representation in the decisionmaking process is not entirely controlled by the whims of the majority so that the power dynamic between majority and minority interests did not render the minority intrinsically powerless.

Recent Developments in Filibusters

In 2013, the power of the filibuster hit a road bump. The Senate voted to eliminate the possibility of using the filibuster on federal executive and judicial nominees (excluding Supreme Court nominees). This move was called the “nuclear option,” and it meant that it would just require a simple majority of Senators in order to move forward on confirmation votes. There were many Obama administration appointees stuck in a limbo because they could not get Senate approval.

168 filibusters of nominees in our history. HALF of them have occurred during Obama years! pic.twitter.com/xbQfsftLGm

— Senator Harry Reid (@SenatorReid) November 21, 2013

While the nuclear option was an unprecedented change that will have real effect on the confirmation process for a long time to come, it only affects cloture and filibuster situations in that particular context.

Conclusion

The filibuster has, for many years, played an important role in the American legislative process. But in the United States’ current condition of hyper-partisanship, it may no longer make sense for the filibuster to hold such a strong pull. Filibustering was created to allow the minority to be able to speak on issues that they feel strongly about — but when does the minority abuse that power to take the majority hostage? The Democrats’ 2013 choice to invoke the “nuclear option” may end up being the first in many changes we see to the filibuster moving forward.

Resources

Primary 

Federalist Papers: No. 62

Additional

Fire Dog Lake: The Filibuster Should be Traded for Eliminating Lifetime Judicial Appointments

Moyers and Company: Larry Cohen on Eliminating the Filibuster

Think Progress: The Filibuster is Bad

Salon: 5 Reasons to Kill the Filibuster

American Prospect: Let’s Shutdown the Filibuster

American Prospect: Don’t Eliminate the Filibuster, Restore It

Real Clear Politics: The Filibuster is a Good Thing

Campaign for Liberty: Filibusters: Good For Restraining Government

Harvard Political Review: In Defense of the Filibuster

Washington Post: Talking Filibusters Are Good For Democracy

How Stuff Works: How a Filibuster Works

Daily Banter: Our Guide to the Filibuster: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Atlantic: If You’d Like a Good, Clean Explanation of the Filibuster Disaster

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post The Senate Filibuster: On Its Way Out? appeared first on Law Street.

In such a celebrity-obsessed society, famous peoples’ identities are sometimes co-opted for other reasons. However, American law does protect identities, to some extent, through something called “the right of publicity.” Read on to find out about whether the laws we have in place to protect rights of publicity are adequate or lacking.

What is the right of publicity?

The right of publicity protects a person’s right to control the commercial use of elements of his or her identity e.g. their name, voice, or likeness. It allows individuals whose identities have been misappropriated to bring civil claims against the offending entities. In several estates, it extends beyond the death of the relevant individuals, enabling their estate or heirs to bring infringement claims on their behalf.

However, the nature and extent of publicity rights protections varies from state to state. For example, Indiana allows publicity rights claims to be brought for misappropriation of an individual’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures or mannerisms.” Rights in these identity elements are protected up to 100 years after the individual’s death. Indiana grants uncommonly expansive publicity rights protection. Because there is no federal right of publicity and there are many differences in protection among the states, many publicity rights claimants often resort to forum shopping. That means that they figure out what court or jurisdiction they think will be friendliest to their case, and bring the case there.

The possibility of forum shopping creates a  “race to the bottom” of the First Amendment ladder. Given the vast reach of entertainment content due to electronic broadcasting and the internet, content providers have to tailor their broadcasts to the rules of the most plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions in order to protect themselves from publicity rights claims. Because social media allows so many permutations of appropriating elements of a person’s identity, the range of actions that can infringe on publicity rights is not entirely clear.  Moreover, in many jurisdictions, the publicity rights laws have not developed enough to keep pace with the increasing possibilities of infringement created by the ability to use the internet.

Who thinks the current laws are adequate?

Proponents of the adequacy of current publicity rights laws argue that claims about the need for a federal publicity right are ill-informed because the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1125) already creates federal standards for publicity rights claims. This act allows plaintiffs to file a federally based claim for infringement. Also, the differences in state publicity laws reflect the needs of different jurisdictions. The fact that certain states do not have such laws may reflect a reasoned and considered policy determination of their legislatures and federalizing the right may undercut those legislative policy needs. Moreover, such a law would infringe on states’ rights to determine which claims may be brought in their courts. If the federal publicity right preempts the state laws, then it could easily overprotect some publicity rights and under-protect others. A uniform federal law couldn’t possibly account for the nuances of different states’ needs with respect to publicity rights. Furthermore, claimants often have difficultly forum shopping because many states have choice of law rules that determine where claims need to be litigated.

What’s the argument to change the laws?

Opponents of the adequacy of the current realm of publicity rights assert that a federal publicity right would be Constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Publicity rights affect a number of issues relating to interstate commerce including what can be broadcast over several channels such as radio, television, and the internet. The rights affect multi-state advertising campaigns and the distribution of products between states as well. Furthermore, forum shopping makes it difficult for promoters to know when their actions will open them up to liability because it is not realistically possible for businessmen to cover themselves against 50 different jurisdictions’ rules and still effectively run business. This is especially true when a dead person’s rights are involved and the infringement claim involves media that is broadcast nationwide.

Even the claims under the Lanham Act are limited because federal law is interpreted differently in different geographic federal circuit jurisdictions and federal court decisions are not binding on the state courts within their jurisdiction. Moreover, the concept of what constitutes a person’s “likeness” varies between states so protected identity elements in one state may not be protected in another.  A federal publicity right statute may solve this problem but the current law does not. Furthermore, publicity rights laws are not always evolving at a pace commensurate with the increasing capabilities of potential infringers.

Conclusion

Publicity laws have run into some problems as the years go on. One big issue is the inconsistency between different states and jurisdictions, and the publicity laws they implement. Another issue is the proliferation of the internet specifically and technology in general. With the resources we now have, it’s entirely possible to create a facsimile of someone’s identity, particularly through tools like social media and photoshop. It’s important that we make sure that people remain in control of their own identities, without infringing on creativity. The current laws are apt in some ways, but could use some updating.

Resources

Primary

U.S. Congress: Lanham Act

Additional

JD Supra: The Federalism Case Against a Federal Right to Publicity

Georgetown Law Journal: The Inalienable Right of Publicity

NY State Bar Association: Why a Reasonable Right of Publicity Should Survive Death: A Rebuttal

University of Georgia Law: Race to the Stars: A Federalism Argument for Leaving the Right of Publicity in the Hands of the States

Amy E. Mitchell, PLLC: Personality Rights

Chapman Law Review: Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, The Bad, and the Right of Publicity

American Bar Association: Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute is Necessary

International Trademark Association: Board Resolutions U.S. Federal Right of Publicity

IP Watchdog: The Right of Publicity: A Doctrine Gone Wild?

LegalZoom: What to Know About Rights of Publicity

Right of Publicity: State Statutes

Cornell University Law School: Right of Publicity Overview

Right of Publicity: Brief History of the Right or Publicity

Library of Congress: Privacy and Publicity Rights

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Publicity Law: The Line Between Creativity and Identity Theft appeared first on Law Street.

In our increasingly diverse society, one debate that’s pretty common to hear floating around is about “affirmative action.” Particularly in regards to college admissions, both proponents and critics of the programs have a lot to say.  Read on to learn about the history of affirmative action policies, and the arguments for and against them.

What is Affirmative Action?

Affirmative action is defined as “a policy or a program that seeks to redress past discrimination through active measures to ensure equal opportunity, as in education and employment.”  AA has existed since the Civil Rights Movement. It began with President John F. Kennedy’s passage of Executive Order 10925, which required government contractors to “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” This essentially mandated that anyone hired by the federal government could not discriminate based on race or ethnicity.

According to current federal AA law, schools giving race-based admissions must meet the strict scrutiny rule. This rule was recently reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2013 Fisher v. University of Texas. If race is used in college application admissions, then the school (or the government if it is a state school) bears the legal burden of demonstrating that it was done because it is “closely related to a compelling government interest” and “narrowly tailored” to meet that interest.  The school must also demonstrate that race-neutral alternatives are not viable in that case.

The debate over AA was also invigorated in 2014, with the Supreme Court Decision Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action. The state of Michigan had banned AA policies at their universities. The court decided that Michigan’s ban of the policies did not violate the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, along with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented from the Schuette decision. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor stated:

The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.

However, AA policies are not consistent state-by-state, and the Schuette case is just another example of the flexibility that states are allowed to take with their policies.

Since JFK’s executive order, AA policies have been modified and refined by the legislature and the courts.  In fact, many sociologists and other experts have reach opposing conclusions about the efficacy of AA on redressing the effects of historical discrimination.  This has led to AA becoming a source of significant political controversy.  AA has been both implemented and enforced at both the federal and the state levels.  Individual states can have vastly different AA policies from the federal government and from each other.  AA is primarily implemented through efforts to “improve the employment and educational opportunities of women and members of minority groups through preferential treatment in job hiring, college admissions, the awarding of government contracts, and the allocation of other social benefits.”

What’s the argument to get rid of Affirmative Action?

Proponents of repealing AA argue that the policy of considering the race of potential beneficiaries disproportionately benefits upper and middle class racial minorities at the expense of poor Caucasians.  Since a larger proportion of minorities are poor than Caucasians, class-based AA would help poor racial minorities more than it would help poor Caucasians. AA can disproportionately harm certain minority groups while benefiting others. For example, Asian Americans have more difficulty getting into top private universities than African Americans, Latino Americans, and Caucasians.  Affirmative Action is reverse-discrimination and it requires the same discrimination that it is supposed to prevent, therefore it is counterproductive. In many cases, it can require less qualified or unqualified applicants to be accepted into positions at the expense of qualified applicants resulting in their eventual failure.

What’s the argument to keep Affirmative Action policies in place?

Opponents of repealing AA argue that ensuring equality of opportunity regardless of one’s background creates the best possible social, cultural and economic future for the people of the United States.  Equality is also most conducive to the strength of the U.S. national defense. Failing to provide such equality would be contrary to the principles that led to the founding of the United States. Some argue that AA should be class-based only.  However, racial minorities of all socioeconomic classes are vulnerable to discrimination and many minorities in all classes become victims of discrimination.  Therefore, in order to be effective AA must be race based as well. Studies have shown that people with “black sounding” names are less likely to be contacted for job interviews than people with “white sounding names. AA has contributed to the creation to the “black middle class” as well.  Finally, studies have shown that minority students are more likely to experience hostility and negative treatment in states that ban AA than in states that utilize it.

Conclusion

Affirmative action policies are a common cause of debate, especially when it comes to our public universities. While they certainly have proved their benefits, there are also valid concerns about the ethical benefits and detractors of the policies.

Resources

Primary

Supreme Court: Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, et al.

Additional

Stanford Magazine: The Case Against Affirmative Action

American Prospect: Class-Based Affirmative Action Is Not the Answer

Annenberg Media Center: Fisher v. UT Austin: Why Affirmative Action Should Be Eliminated

Pantagraph: Affirmative Action Should Be Eliminated

Alternet: 10 Reasons Affirmative Action Still Matters Today

TIME: Why We Still Need Affirmative Action

New Yorker: Why America Still Needs Affirmative Action

Real Clear Politics: Good News About Affirmative Action’s Future

Cornell University Law School: Affirmative Action

About News: The Affirmative Action Debate: Five Concerns

About News: Key Events in Affirmative Action’s History

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Affirmative Action

Newsweek: Why We Still Need Affirmative Action

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Affirmative Action Laws: A History of Political Controversy appeared first on Law Street.

Conflicts of interest are a tough field for law firms and individual lawyers to navigate. In order to help with these tricky situations, the American Bar Association has created a set of guidelines to prevent conflicts of interest. But whether or not they’re effective and prudent is a constant topic of argument. Read on to learn about the ABA’s rules, and the arguments for and against them.

What is a conflict of interest?

A conflict of interest occurs when an individual or firm represents multiple clients whose goals or requests conflict with one another. For example, a conflict of interest would occur if a law firm represented both a company and an individual suing that company.

What are the ABA’s rules about conflict of interest?

The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7 states:

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or

(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Simplified, this rule prohibits lawyers from representing the interests of anyone whose interests are directly against any of his or her current clients, or taking on any representation that creates a meaningful chance that representing the new client will significantly lower the lawyer’s ability to help the current client.

However, there are exceptions within this rule.  A lawyer can accept the representation if he reasonably believes that he can provide “competent and diligent” services to each affected client, the representation is not otherwise illegal, the lawyer isn’t representing two clients against each other in the same suit and each affected client gives informed, written consent.

Ideas about conflict of interest don’t just include a given lawyer’s particular firm, but also the relationships that they have with other lawyers, family members, and the like. In essence, any way that they can be influenced by conflicting parties can raise conflict of interest concerns.

What are the reasons to support these rules?

Proponents of the sufficiency of ABA conflict of interest rules base their arguments on the comments to Rule 1.7. Prohibiting the representation of directly adverse clients (even if the lawyer is representing them in unrelated cases) is proper for multiple reasons. The client against whom the adverse representation is undertaken may feel betrayed and that feeling of betrayal may interfere with the lawyer’s ability to effectively represent the client’s interests. Also, the client who is receiving the adverse representation may be concerned that the lawyer is not zealously performing the representation out of loyalty to the first client. The import of these fears is magnified if the lawyer is forced to cross-examine his client in an unrelated case. This can cause severe distrust and animosity between the lawyer and the client.

What are the reasons to disagree with the ABA rules?

Opponents of the sufficiency of ABA conflict rules argue that if the clients’ opposing interests are purely economic such as if a lawyer is representing two competing corporations in unrelated cases, then consent may not be required. This situation allows lawyers to represent corporations that are indirectly adverse against each other. Serving a corporate client’s interests that are indirectly adverse to another corporate client can still be harmful to the latter corporate client. This means that a lawyer can conceivably charge money to a client that she is indirectly harming.

Case Study: Covington & Burlington, LLP and 3M

A judge ruled in 2012 that Minnesota law firm Covington & Burlington LLP couldn’t represent the state in a suit against manufacturing conglomerate 3M because it had previously represented 3M itself. The suit involved chemicals used by 3M that were dumped into landfills in the area, and then caused health problems in approximately 60,000 residents. Despite the fact that Covington traditionally represented the state when it came to environmental issues, the judge ruled it a conflict of interest because Covington had previously represented 3M in arguments involving those exact same chemicals.

Conclusion

Conflicts of interest are difficult to navigate, even for the most professional lawyers. The ABA has attempted to create guidelines to avoid conflicts of interest. While the guidelines receive some negative feedback, they are in place for a reason and most likely will not be going away anytime soon.

Resources

Primary

ABA: Rule 1.7

ABA: Comment on Rule 1.7

ABA: How to Avoid Conflicts

Additional

JD Journal: Covington & Burling LLP Not Permitted to Represent Minnesota in 3M Case

JD Journal: Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Preamble & Scope

American Bar: Conflict-Checking Systems: Three Great (and Cheap) Ways to Effectively Manage Conflict Checking

American Bar: Client Rapport and Ethical Considerations

Tech Crunch: Judge Allows Quin Emanuel To Continue Representing Snapchat in Lawsuit

ABA Journal: Model rule change aims to help lawyers confronting conflicts issues involving multiple jurisdictions

ABA Journal: Model Rule Change Recognizes Need for Conflicts Checks Before Lawyers Move, Law Firms Merge

Elliot Schissel Law Blog: What Does the ABA’s adoption of New Conflicts Rules Mean for New York?

St. Louis University Law Journal: Using the Concept of ‘A Philosophy of Lawyering’ in Teaching Professional Responsibility

TLIE: ABA Approves Changes in Model Rules

ID Journal: O.J. Simpson Returns to Court

American Legal Ethics Library: End-of-Life Notice

Attorneys Advantage: Do You Represent Multiple Clients in the Same Matter?

Massachusetts: SIDEWAYS: Lateral Hires and Conflicts of Interest

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Conflict of Interest: The ABA’s Guidelines and What They Mean appeared first on Law Street.

The minimum wage was first created to ensure that workers are protected from being underpaid for their work; however, given that national and local costs of living have varied over time, whether or not the minimum wage amounts are fair has been the main pillar of the  national debate for some time. Read on to learn about the minimum wage and all of the controversies and debates surrounding it.

Current Minimum Wage Laws

The Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 is a law passed by Congress that requires employees to be paid at least $7.25 per hour. The act took effect in 2009 as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. This law only applies to jobs that are under the purview of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Tipped workers may only be paid less than $7.25 an hour if their hourly wages plus tips match or exceed $7.25.

The Fair Labor Standards Act is a federal law that Congress passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Federal laws passed under that power are only effective if they pertain to an area that affects commerce between multiple states. Therefore, the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Fair Minimum Wage Act only regulate wages in businesses that are involved in interstate commerce. Businesses that are not sufficiently involved in interstate commerce are not regulated by the federal law but may still be regulated by state or local minimum wage laws. If there are state or local minimum wage laws in effect in the area a (non-interstate commercial) business operates then those laws determine the minimum wage employees of such a business can be paid.

State minimum wage laws are very variable.

The map below represents the minimum wage in a number of states. Green indicates a state minimum wage that is higher than federal minimum wage, yellow shows states with no minimum wage laws, blue states have the same minimum wage as the federal minimum wage, and red states have minimum wage laws lower than the federal minimum wage.

Map of minimum wage variations by state, courtesy of the U.S. Department of Labor via Wikipedia.

According to the Department of Labor, the laws are interpreted as follows:

Federal minimum wage law supersedes state minimum wage laws where the federal minimum wage is greater than the state minimum wage. In those states where the state minimum wage is greater than the federal minimum wage, the state minimum wage prevails.

So why do we still have separate federal and state minimum wage laws? One reason is, of course, politics. The states that have lower minimum wage laws keep them on the books in part to protest what they see as too high of a federal minimum wage. There’s also a more practical application: there are certain workers, such as seasonal workers or those on small farms, who are exempt from the federal laws. In some cases, the state laws may still offer some parameters for those workers.

What are arguments for keeping the federal minimum wage as is?

Supporters of the current federal minimum wage argue that raising the minimum wage will diminish the job market in an economy that is already suffering. They argue that raising the minimum wage to benefit the poor is a shortsighted strategy. Since a majority of the poor (60 percent) are unemployed, raising the minimum wage only makes it more difficult for them to find jobs because it raises the value that they have to demonstrate in order to justify being hired. Moreover, most of the people receiving minimum wage pay are above the nation’s median income so most of the funds workers receive from a higher minimum wage won’t go to the impoverished.

Supporters of keeping the minimum wage law where it is also worry that the costs of a higher minimum wage would be passed on to the consumers, who may be struggling themselves. They reason that the money has to come from somewhere, and in many cases it would come from an increase in the price of goods. In general, it would make it more expensive for employers to hire employees, and have negative ramifications throughout many parts of the economy.

Another argument against raising the minimum wage stems from an idea about the purpose of the minimum wage. Minimum wage jobs are often viewed as “stepping stones” for young people, or those looking to get back on their feet–not jobs for those who need to raise families or be permanently employed in that particular place of business. Those who subscribe to this argument tend to worry that with a higher minimum wage, these jobs become permanent paths rather than just stepping stones, and younger people will no longer be able to get their foot in the door.

What are arguments for increasing the minimum wage?

Those who argue in favor of increasing the current federal minimum wage argue that it does not even pay enough to keep a family of three above the poverty line. The average cost of living has increased by leaps and bounds, especially in larger cities. The minimum wage has not increased proportionately with inflation or the pay of the average worker. Today, the minimum wage is insufficient to keep a full-time working parent and one child out of poverty. At a bare minimum the federal minimum wage should be enough to keep a working parent and her child above the poverty line. Along the same lines, supporters of increasing the minimum wage point out that because those who work minimum wage jobs have such a difficult time making ends meet, many of them have to get some sort of government assistance, which is also a big problem for the economy.

That is why the Obama Administration is advocating for legislation to raise the federal minimum wage to $10.10 an hour. This change would raise America’s GDP, and reduce income disparities between several population demographics.

Conclusion

The minimum wage, and its many derivations across the states, will always be a contentious and politicized issue. The actual economic implications of raising or lowering the minimum wage are difficult to glean, and the arguments are sharp. That being said, the minimum wage debate is far from over.

Resources

Primary 

US Senate: Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007

Department of Labor: Minimum Wage

Department of Labor: History of Changes to the Minimum Wage Law

Department of Labor: Minimum Wage Laws in the States

Additional

Forbes: Why Raising the Minimum Wage Kills Jobs

Washington Post: Economists Agree: Raising the Minimum Wage Reduces Poverty

The New York Times: Raise That Wage

The White House: Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address

Atlantic: Minimum Wage Was Once Enough to Keep a Family of Three Out of Poverty

Economic Policy Institute: Raising the Federal Minimum Wage to $10.10 Would Give Working Families, and the Overall Economy, a Much-Needed Boost

CNN: Raising Minimum Wage Won’t Lower Poverty

America’s Best Companies: Five Important Exceptions to Know Regarding Minimum Wage

The New York Times: Raising Minimum Wage Would Ease Income Gap but Carries Political Risks

Entrepreneur: Listen to Small Business: Don’t Increase the Minimum Wage

Deseret News: In Our Opinion: Don’t Raise the Minimum Wage

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Debating Minimum Wage in America appeared first on Law Street.

In the age of the internet, phones with cameras, and digital picture-taking, it’s become much easier to “steal” artistic property. Both the United States and the international community try their best to prevent the theft of artistic and intellectual material through copyright laws. In addition to regular copyright laws, there also exists something called “moral copyright.” Moral rights are artists’ rights to protect the integrity and ownership of their copyrighted works. They include the right of attribution, the right to have the work published anonymously or pseudonymously, and the right to the integrity of the work.  Preserving the integrity of the work creates limitations upon the rights of others to distort the work, alter it, or do anything that attenuates the artist’s relationship with the work.

Read on to find out how both artists’ copyright and moral copyrights are protected by law, the effectiveness of the laws, and the arguments for and against the different laws in place to protect artists’ rights.

U.S. Copyright Law

The stated purpose of U.S. Copyright law is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Copyright law protects many forms of artistic works including literary, musical, dramatic, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, audiovisual works, sound recordings, derivative works, compilations and architectural works. Even though the realm of works protected is wide, there are differing levels of protection that apply for some of these works.  For example, sound recordings are protected in a different manner than written documents are.

Copyright law protects the author’s manner of expressing the idea but it does not protect the idea itself.  This means that copyright-protected works of authorship can still be plagiarized under the law. For example, a paper that describes a scientific theory may be protected from reproduction or distribution, but someone else can restate the theory with a different manner of expression and circumvent the original creator’s copyright protection.

Copyright protection ensures that the protection of the work lasts longer than the person who created it. Current law mandates that an individual person’s copyrighted works are protected for the duration of his or her life, plus 70 years afterward. For works created by multiple authors, the length of the protection is based on the life of the last surviving author. If a work is made for hire, an anonymous and pseudonymous works (where the author’s identity is not in Copyright Office records), the duration of protection will be ninety-five years from publication or one hundred and twenty years from creation, whichever is shorter. This makes it less likely that an author’s work will fade into the public domain before he or she has a chance to reap its full commercial value. This also serves as somewhat of a safeguard to an author’s legacy after he or she has passed on.

Copyright protection does not exist for articles that have a “useful function.”  For example, an artist’s drawing of a train would be protected by copyright, also the creation of a 3D model of the train would be actionable. However, creating an actual, working version of the depicted train would not be actionable under copyright law. Some creators’ work have both useful and non-useful, aesthetic attributes. Copyright law protects the aesthetic attributes but not the useful ones. If the aesthetic attributes cannot be separated from the useful ones, then the owner does not receive federal copyright protection. This means that owners can potentially lose copyright protection because their creation has applications that are useful to society.

Why do proponents argue in favor of current American copyright laws?

Proponents of the adequacy of U.S. copyright law argue that the duration of the rights gives authors time to effectively profit from their work without fear of having their labors stolen. The law properly makes exceptions for certain socially valuable non-commercial uses of copyrighted material by providing such users with Fair Use as a defense to an infringement claim. This allows copyrighted works to be used for socially beneficial purposes before the expiration of protection without infringing on the author’s commercial or economic interests. The substantiality requirement prevents frivolous uses of copyright protection e.g. for single words.

Why do opponents argue against current American copyright laws?

Opponents of the adequacy of U.S. Copyright protection argue that the exceptions are too broad and too easy to invoke. In certain situations, alleged infringers can cause significant economic damage to a creator’s interests and still be protected by a defense granted by copyright law. Copyright protection only protects the author’s manner of expression, not his ideas.  Ideas can often still be plagiarized without giving rise to a copyright infringement claim. Also, useful articles that don’t qualify for patent protection still don’t get copyright protection. Since patent protection is more difficult to obtain and has a shorter duration than copyright protection, some authors are disadvantaged by the usefulness of their work, which is contrary to the purpose of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. Finally, if content is too minimal then copyright law does not protect it.

Moral Copyright Laws in the United States

U.S. Copyright law does not recognize moral rights beyond the extent to which they are recognized by the Berne Convention, of which the U.S. is a member.

The rationale for the lack of additional moral rights protections in federal law is that Congress believed that they were unnecessary because other areas of law are sufficient to protect artists’ interests. U.S. copyright law, governed by the Copyright Act of 1976, already grants artists the exclusive right to create derivative works. Defamation laws, unfair competition laws and trademark laws governed by the Lanham Act grant artists sufficient civil claims against entities who intentionally or recklessly mislead the public about an author’s work and those who attempt to profit from such conduct. Moreover, certain states have created their own moral rights laws, mitigating the need for a federal statute.

Furthermore, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) provides increased moral rights to certain types of art i.e. paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures and still photographic images that are produced for exhibition only, and existing in single copies or in limited editions of 200 or fewer copies, signed and numbered by the artist. These rights include the right to claim authorship, the right to prevent the use of one’s name on any work the author did not create, and the right to prevent use of one’s name on any work that has been distorted, mutilated, or modified in a way that would be prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation. Authors of works of “recognized stature” may prevent the grossly negligent or intentional destruction of their work. The phrase “recognized stature” has not been statutorily defined, but there is a lot of case law interpreting the same. VARA rights only apply to a limited set of works but the protections for those works are substantial. Buyers of the works must get written waivers from the copyright owners if they wish to employ any VARA rights. If the rights are not waived then the author or last surviving author of a joint work generally retains them for life.

What are the arguments for keeping the moral copyright laws as they are? 

Proponents of the sufficiency of U.S. moral rights law argue that VARA grants vast protection to artists. VARA rights generally last for life and they can only be extinguished by signed, written waivers. They are secure enough to ensure that artists have recourse to act when owners of individual instantiations of their work infringe their creative rights. Furthermore, even when VARA rights don’t vest in an artist’s work, he or she can still utilize copyright, defamation, unfair Competition laws, or any relevant state statute, to defend moral rights of their work.

What are the arguments against keeping the moral copyright laws as they are? 

Opponents argue that there are many works that VARA does not protect. For example, VARA doesn’t apply to written works or to works made for hire. Also, since copyright law does not protect ideas, an author who is known for innovating an idea cannot utilize copyright law to protect the moral rights to that idea. Finally, state moral rights laws vary and it is difficult for an artist to know if the state he or she is located in will have jurisdiction over the alleged infringer of their Moral Rights.

Conclusion

Given that art is so subjective and so rarely indexed, it can certainly be difficult for artists to protect their work. There are many different kind of laws in place to protect artists’ copyrights, including some laws that loosely protect moral copyrights. While there are disagreements about the effects and implementations of the laws, its clear that artists’ works do need to be protected.

Resources

Primary

U.S. Congress: 17 USC 501 Infringement of Copyright

Cornell  University Law School: Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990

U.S. Congress Committee on the Judiciary: Copyright Law Revision

Additional

McClanahan Powers: Innocent Copyright Infringers: The Importance of an Adequate Copyright Notice to Defeat Them

Electronic Frontier Foundation: New Study Affirms Fewer Copyright Restrictions Benefit the Economy, Amid Renewed Calls for SOPA 2.0 

Copyhype: Who Benefits from Copyright?

Law and Economics Consulting Associates: Agreed Use and Fair Use: The Economic Effects of Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions

Harvard Law School: Moral Rights Basics

Library of Congress: Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks

Washington University in St. Louis: Economists Say Copyright and Patent Laws Are Killing Innovation; Hurting Economy

TechDirt: Yet Another Study Shows That Weaker Copyright Benefits Everyone

Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal: A Case of Bad Credit? The United States and the Protection of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law

Washington and Lee Law Review: Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright

Boston University International Law Journal: Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the United Kingdom

Information Today: Moral Rights for Authors and Artists

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Intellectual Property

Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports: Protecting Philosophical Ideas With Copyright?

U.S. Copyright Office: Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and Librarians

College Art Association: Intellectual Property and the Arts

Leech Tishman: Litigation; a Counterfeit Pays

Golden Gate University Law Review: The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Further Defining the Rights and Duties of Artists and Real Property Owners

vLex: VARA Rights Get a Second Life

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post U.S. Copyright Law: Enough Protection for Artists? appeared first on Law Street.

As a part of the “war on drugs,” a law was passed in 1986 that criminalized the use of illegal substances. The two substances, powder and crack cocaine, were criminalized differently, leading to inconsistent laws and a notable lack of fairness in sentencing. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act was passed in an effort to remedy this disparity. Now, four years down the road, it’s important to look back and evaluate its impact. Read on to learn about the law, its supporters and dissidents, and results.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed during the heart of the war on drugs. It was the first big piece of legislation, and it included mandatory minimum sentences for the possession of certain drugs.

Powder cocaine is white, and true to its name, powdery. There are many ways in which to consume cocaine, but the most well known is by “snorting” it, or inhaling through the nose. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, if you were found with at least 500 grams of cocaine, the minimum mandated sentence was five years without parole. Crack cocaine is smoked, and is created when cocaine, water, and baking soda are combined. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, if you were found with just five grams of crack cocaine, the minimum mandated sentence was also five years without parole.

That means that crack cocaine was criminalized at a 100:1 ratio in comparison to powder cocaine. In addition to being unfair, the standards have been criticized as inherently racist. Watch the video below for more information this.

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010

The Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), signed by President Obama, was passed by the 111th United States Congress. The law’s primary provisions reduced disparities in the differences between the amount of powder cocaine and crack cocaine needed to trigger federal penalties under the law. It also eliminated the mandatory five-year minimum sentencing provision required under the previous law. The FSA made fundamental changes to U.S. drug law, including the removal of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence for first-time possession of crack cocaine, an increase in the amount of crack cocaine that is required for a federal mandatory minimum prison term to apply, and the increase of financial penalties for trafficking a controlled substance. Sentencing judges are allowed to consider violence and other aggravating factors.

The FSA requires the U.S. Sentencing Commission to take specific measures regarding sentencing. These include raising sentencing guidelines for those convicted of violence in relation to a drug offense, include aggravating and mitigating factors in its consideration of punishments for drug offenses, and present a report to Congress detailing the FSA’s impact on sentencing for drug offenses.

What were the arguments in favor of the FSA?

Proponents of the FSA argue that studies show that crack cocaine and powder cocaine are equally addictive and the government never had any scientific basis for believing otherwise. Moreover, the previous law created significantly disproportionate sentencing rules for drug offenders.  For example, under the old law a person found possessing five grams of crack cocaine was given the same punishment as a person possessing 500 grams of powder cocaine. Also, ten grams of crack cocaine was enough for a 10-year minimum sentence, but 1,000 grams of powder cocaine were required for the same sentence.

That disparity evinces a probable racial bias in the old law. In 1995, the U.S. Sentencing Commission stated that the law created “racial imbalance in federal prisons and led to more severe sentences for low-level crack dealers than for wholesale suppliers of powder cocaine. … As a result, thousands of people — mostly African Americans — have received disproportionately harsh prison sentences.” Crack Cocaine users in the U.S. are composed of 52 percent whites and 38 percent blacks, yet 88 percent of the sentences for crack cocaine-related offenses were imposed on blacks while only 4 percent were imposed on whites. The DEA Administrator under the Bush administration stated that because of the disparity “the credibility of our entire drug enforcement system is weakened.”

What were the arguments against the FSA?

Opponents of the FSA argue that the new law may revive the dangers that the old law was intended to prevent. The severe sentences under the old law were justified by the facts that trafficking and distribution of crack cocaine more often involves violence and danger to the community than what generally comes with powder cocaine and the offenders more often have violent criminal histories.

Law Enforcement Organizations have also opposed the act, arguing that more severe sentences are justified because crack is often trafficked with weapons. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 29 percent of all crack cases from October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009 involved a weapon, compared to only 16 percent for powder cocaine. These police organizations advocate raising the penalties for possessing powder cocaine rather than lowering the penalties for crack cocaine carriers. Since crack cocaine distribution is generally conducted with more violence and risk to the public than powder cocaine distribution, it makes sense that the law treats participation in a more dangerous criminal culture as a more serious crime.

What has been the reaction to the FSA?

The Fair Sentencing Act was a step in a good direction. It changed the much maligned crack cocaine to powder cocaine possession ration from 100:1 to 18:1. While some advocates call for a complete eradication of any discrepancies in sentencing, others point out that crack is known to be slightly more addictive, and is more likely to be involved with respect to violent crimes.

There’s also an argument about the retroactivity of this law. Retroactivity essentially means that the FSA would be applied to the thousands who are still in jail under the 1986 law. This could lead to reduced sentences for those prisoners. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the FSA is in fact retroactive; however, the government asked for an en banc review, which means that the entire panel, not just the individual judges involved in that case, review the possibility of retroactivity. In the en banc review, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the original decision. At this point, the FSA is not applied retroactively.

The FSA has made headway. Around the time of its passage, it was estimated that ten years down the road, the federal prison population will decline by about 4,000 people. There’s still work to be done to make sure that everyone receives a fair sentence, based on his or her crime committed and not on arbitrary standards, but the FSA is absolutely a step in the right direction.

 Resources

Primary

U.S. Congress: Fair Sentencing Act of 2010

United States Sentencing Commission:
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts

United States Senate Sentencing Commission: Fair Sentencing Act Amendment

Additional 

Ron Paul: Statement on the Fair Sentencing Act

ACLU: Fair Sentencing Act

Sojourners: The Fair Sentencing Act: A (Small) Step Towards Making Things Right

Sentencing Law and Policy: Fascination and frustration with “finality fixation” in en banc Sixth Circuit Blewett arguments

Madame Noir: How the Fair Sentencing Act Is Still Not So Fair

Brennan Center: Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013

Progessive: Drug sentencing reform doesn’t go far enough

Youth Today: Congress Passes Law to Reduce Crack/Cocaine Sentencing Disparities

Nation: Beyond the Fair Sentencing Act

Huffington Post: Fair Sentencing Act

Mic: Fair Sentencing Act: Are Crack Cocaine Laws Intentionally Racist?

FAMM: Crack Cocaine Mandatory Minimum Sentences

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post The Fair Sentencing Act Aims to Align Drug Sentencing Disparities appeared first on Law Street.

Advisory opinions are essentially pieces of advice offered by courts as a way to provide guidance on a particular law or issue. Since its inception, the United States Supreme Court, and federal courts in general, have not been allowed to issue advisory opinions, even though some onlookers have speculated that they may help cut down work flow and clear up ambiguities in the law. Read on to learn about the history of advisory opinions, the Supreme Court’s ban on releasing them, and how that has affected our American jurisprudence system.

What Exactly is an Advisory Opinion?

An advisory opinion is a non-binding explanation of the legal implications of a situation that has not arisen in actual litigation. An advisory opinion allows the legislature, the executive branch, or a lower court to gain insight into the prevailing judicial interpretation of a law, regulation, or constitutional amendment. This reduces the likelihood that a governmental act will be invalidated for conflicting with the Constitution, so it could save time or money. Advisory opinions are not binding precedent but are often treated as persuasive if no other precedent exists.

Why Can’t the Supreme Court Issue Advisory Opinions?

In the United States, federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Article III designates that any legal opinion promulgated by federal courts must pertain to an issue that is “mature for judicial resolution” and the parties must have a palpable interest in the case. Put more simply, the Supreme Court, or any lower federal courts, can only rule in a real case, not just when someone brings a topic to the court to ask for an opinion.

Partly at issue is the separation of powers. The job of the legislative branch is to make the laws, the executive branch is supposed to enforce them, and the judicial branch is supposed to interpret them. By allowing the judicial branch to interpret them earlier than is unnecessary, that separation becomes blurred. That’s the argument made by John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, when he refused to offer judicial advice to President George Washington or Alexander Hamilton. Later, Justice William R. Day reinvigorated the argument against Supreme Court advisory opinions in Muskrat v. United States. He stated as a reason to not offer advisory opinions that:

The result will be that this court, instead of keeping within the limits of judicial power and deciding cases or controversies arising between opposing parties, as the Constitution intended it should, will be required to give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative action, a function never conferred upon it by the Constitution.

Are There Alternatives to Advisory Opinions?

Certain state courts allow federal courts and courts of other states to ask them certified questions about actual controversies involving the state’s law. The U.S. Supreme Court also accepts certified questions about actual controversies from lower federal courts; however, this is a rare occurrence. A certified question is a request from one court to another court for clarification of a question of law. For example, if a cause of action under a state statute is brought in federal court, the federal court may send a certified question to the state court in order to gain clarification about how to interpret the state statute in accordance with the state’s jurisprudence.

Federal courts are able to employ preventative adjudication in the form of declaratory judgments due to the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act. A declaratory judgment is a legal finding of a party’s actual legal rights in an actual case or controversy (or lack thereof) against another party. These judgments are binding though they can be appealed. The act allows a party to seek a declaration of his or her rights against another party even if no specific legal relief is sought in the case. If the proven facts show that there is a possibility that relief may be warranted in the future, then the act gives federal courts the discretion to issue declaratory judgments that define parties’ rights.

Federal courts maintain artful legal doctrines in order to ensure that Declaratory Judgments do not amount to de-facto Advisory Opinions. These doctrines are codified in the case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.  In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court promulgated specific guidelines for the use of Judicial Review:

1. The Court will not determine the constitutionality of legislation in nonadversary proceedings.
2. It will not anticipate a question of constitutional law.
3. It will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than needed.
4. It will not rule on constitutionality if there is another ground for deciding the case.
5. It will not determine a statute’s validity unless the person complaining has been injured by it.
6. It will not invalidate a statute at the instance of persons who have taken advantage of its benefits.
7. It will always ascertain whether any reasonable interpretation of a statute will allow it to avoid the constitutional issue.

These guidelines are designed to prevent courts from promulgating interpretations of the Constitution outside of a ruling in an actual case or controversy.

What is the Argument for Changing the Laws to Allow Federal Courts to Issue Advisory Opinions?

Proponents of granting the Supreme Court the power to issue advisory opinions argue that judicial economy will be improved by the ability to issue opinions more quickly about pervasive legal issues. They also argue that the government can avoid wasting time and resources investing in programs and policies only to have it all be for naught if the government’s action is held to be unconstitutional. Ten states allow their highest courts to issue advisory opinions and the mechanism is an effective legal procedure in those states.

What is the Argument for Maintaining the Status Quo?

Opponents of granting the Supreme Court the power to issue advisory opinions argue that

Every tendency to deal with constitutional questions abstractly, to formulate them in terms of barren legal questions, leads to … sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

There are more expeditious and expedient means that government actors have for gaining necessary legal interpretations and findings from the courts, such as certified questions. Furthermore, there are procedural mechanisms that allow the legal status of a situation to be determined without the expense and difficulty of a full trial, such as declaratory judgments.

 Resources

Primary

U.S. Archives: U.S. Constitution

Founders Constitution: John Jay to George Washington

Documents in Early American History: John Jay Letter

Additional

Fire Dog Lake: Why Can’t Congress Just Ask the Supreme Court Ahead of Time?

Indiana Law Journal: The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis

Fordham Law Review: The Advisory Opinion and the United States
Supreme Court

Fordham Law Review: The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective

Ohio Northern University Law Review: The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant Opinion

VIllanova Law Review:Advisory Opinions as a Problem Solving Process

Mel A. Topf: A Doubtful and Perilous Experiment: Advisory Opinions, State Constitutions, and Judicial Supremacy

Cornell Law: Advisory Opinion

UMKC School of Law: Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial Power:

UMKC School of Law: Standing, Advisory Opinions, Mootness, and Ripeness

Roger Williams University Law Review: The Jurisprudence of the Advisory Opinion Process in Rhode Island

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Advisory Opinions in Federal Courts: Forbidden Territory appeared first on Law Street.

In today’s world of constantly shared media, including photos, videos, and artwork, it’s easy to get confused about copyright laws. People who create content have the copyright to it, but there are some exceptions. For a long time, we’ve had the concept of “Fair Use” in American jurisprudence. Read on to learn about Fair Use, the arguments for it, and the arguments against it.

What exactly is Fair Use?

Under 17 U.S.C. 107, a person who infringes the exclusive copyright rights held by another can avoid copyright infringement liability if he proves that the infringement constituted Fair Use. Fair Use is an exception to copyright rights that is written into U.S. Copyright law. It is an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim, which means that if the plaintiff makes a  prima facie showing of the elements of infringement and can therefore claim that the defendant did infringe on his copyright, then the defendant, in order to avoid liability, must meet the burden of proving at least a prima facie showing that Fair Use applies in his case. If the defendant succeeds, then the plaintiff will then have the burden of showing that there are insufficient Fair Use factors in the case. Whoever fails to meet their burden loses. If Fair Use is claimed it is analyzed by the courts under several fact-specific factors, including the following:

• The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
• The nature of the copyrighted work;
• The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
• The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

The relevance of each factor varies with the facts of each individual case; however, the fourth factor is generally the most important. Courts are allowed to consider additional factors to the ones enumerated in the Copyright Act.

The first Fair Use factor is the “purpose and character of the use.”  Courts consider whether the use comports with the intent of copyright law to engender creativity that enriches the realm of knowledge available to the public, or whether the use merely attempts to serve as a substitute for the original, serving the second creator’s financial interests. To qualify for the Fair Use defense, the user must show that the use advances the knowledge or progress of the arts by adding something new. A key consideration is whether the use is transformative or simply derivative. The Supreme Court has held that the extent of the transformativeness of a use of copyrighted material is inversely proportional to the import of factors weighing against Fair Use.

The second Fair Use factor is “the nature of the copyrighted work.”  For example, courts consider whether the work is fictional or non-fictional. Also, individual facts and ideas are generally not protected under Copyright law.  This factor is generally the least relevant in a Fair Use determination.

The third Fair Use factor is “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” This factor is about the amount and proportion of the work that is used without authorization. Generally, the amount used is inversely proportional to the likelihood of a finding of Fair Use; however, the use of small but important portions of a work may constitute infringement despite the minimal nature.

The last factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”  This factor is based on whether and to what extent the unauthorized use negatively impacts the copyright owner’s ability to exploit the value of his or her own work.  Courts consider whether the specific use is harmful to the owner’s financial interests and whether similar mainstream uses would be harmful. If the unauthorized work creates a market replacement for the original then that indicates harm to the copyright owner’s interests. Certain kinds of market harm can constitute Fair Use e.g. parody or criticism. Copyright protection does not shield a work from negative reviews.

What is the argument for keeping Fair Use?

Proponents of retaining the Fair Use defense argue that it is intended to allow educational and nonprofit organizations to utilize copyright material for noncommercial purposes that do not harm the interests of copyright owners without fear of litigation. These purposes are socially valuable actions that allow vulnerable members of society access to the public’s realm of knowledge. The words “educational” and “nonprofit” are even written into the Copyright Act. Moreover, the exception is not easily abused because educational value of an unauthorized use is neither dispositive nor the most critical factor.  The other factors are still considered as well.

A study by numerous technology companies found that Fair Use exceptions to Copyright law were responsible for more than $4.5 trillion in yearly revenue for the U.S. economy–roughly one-sixth of the United States’ total gross domestic product. The study also found that Fair Use was responsible for more than 18 percent of U.S. economic growth and more than 11 million American jobs. Fair Use is vital to modern life in the information age.

Courtesy of Association of Research Libraries.

 What is the argument against Fair Use?

Opponents of retaining the Fair Use defense argue that Fair Use is a problem because it leads to a large amount of litigation. Fair Use is commonly misunderstood by the public and emboldens many individuals into conduct that risks infringing the copyrights of owners. The law is deliberately ambiguous in order to give the courts the flexibility to make fact-specific determinations, therefore, different courts can interpret copyright law differently and it is difficult for an owner to know the extent to which his or her work will be protected from infringement.

By granting an affirmative defense to copyright infringers the law makes it more difficult for copyright owners to rely on the courts for justice. Owners may be forced to not only prove that their work is copyrighted and that it was used by the defendant, but also they may be forced to prove the absence of Fair Use as well. Fair Use also makes it more expensive and time consuming to litigate copyright infringement claims because it essentially creates two trials out of one. First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of infringement, which the defendant is free to undercut and the defendant only needs to attempt to show Fair Use after the plaintiff’s burden is met. Furthermore, if Fair Use is shown, then the plaintiff has to show that it does not apply in the case. This is an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff.

 Conclusion

How to protect fairness when it comes to using someone else’s copyrighted content is a complicated question. Fair Use is an answer to that question, although clearly an imperfect one. As our technology and ability to share content continues to develop, however, they may need to be revisited.

Resources

Primary

BitLaw: Fair Use Statute

US Copyright Office: Copyright Fair Use

Additional

ARL: The Good News About Library Fair Use

Electronic Frontier Foundation: Court Upholds Legality of Google Books: Tremendous Victory for Fair Use and the Public Interest

Tech Dirt: Fair Use: Worth More to the Economy Than Copyright?

Wired: Study: Fair Use Contributes Trillions to U.S. Economy

Electronic Frontier Foundation: Supreme Court Gets it Wrong in Golan v. Holder, Public Domain Mourns

Blog Herald: The Limitations of Fair Use

Copyright Crash Course: Will We Need Fair Use in the 21st Century?

Stanford: Fair Use

Columbia: Fair Use Checklist

Columbia: Fair Use in Education and Research

Fair Use Tube: Fairusetube

Electronic Frontier Foundation: New Study Affirms Fewer Copyright Restrictions Benefit the Economy, Amid Renewed Calls for SOPA 2.0

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Fair Use: Is it Really Fair? appeared first on Law Street.

It was the event that no one could stop talking about between 1994 and 1995. Everyone around the country was glued to the television to see what would happen to O.J. Simpson, once-beloved celebrity and accused murderer. Before O.J., there were televised trials of Ted Bundy, the Menendez Brothers, and Jeffrey Dahmer, among others. And since O.J., we’ve televised quite a few high profile trials. For celebrity buffs, Lindsey Lohan’s streamed on TMZ. There was, of course, the horrifying Casey Anthony case that captured national attention during the summer of 2011. Most recently, spectators were able to watch the Jodi Arias and George Zimmerman proceedings from their homes.

In fact, media streams of famous court cases have become rather ubiquitous in American culture. But should they be? We’ve turned everything from Congressional debate to young children in beauty pageants into must-see TV. Should trials be the same way? Read on to learn about the debate over televising trials, and the arguments for and against allowing cameras into courtrooms.

 What are the rules about filming trials?

In the United States, the general rule is that photography and broadcasting of criminal trials in federal courts is banned but can be overridden by a law or another court rule. Many judges decided to ban broadcasting and photography from courtrooms after the O.J. Simpson trial. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that televising trials is not a violation of constitutional due process.  In certain cases, jury deliberations are publicly broadcasted. The broadcasting of criminal trials is very controversial and even the Senate Judiciary Committee and the U.S. Supreme Court have differing views about its propriety.

 What’s the argument for putting criminal trials on TV?

Proponents of televising criminal trials assert various arguments, including that since many Americans have no personal experience with the criminal justice system and many learn about current events entirely from television, televising criminal trials is vital to individuals’ understanding of the legal system.  U.S. Senator Charles Schumer stated that:

Courts are an important part of our government, and the more our government institutions are shown to the public, the more dignified they become, and the more the public comes to understand them. Allowing cameras into our courtrooms will help demystify them and let the public evaluate how well the system works.

Furthermore, a Colorado Supreme Court Justice argued that religious worship and ceremonies are televised and there is no public consensus that religious practices are denigrated when broadcast so there is no reason to assume that the legal process will be.

Even if being televised can make witnesses nervous, that is not necessarily a bad thing. Nervousness makes potential discrepancies and inaccuracies easier to notice and reluctant witnesses can be persuaded by the legal action that brings them to court e.g. police escort and subpoenas. Finally, though there is an ongoing study, there is no evidence that televising criminal cases has more impact on a criminal trial than the presence of an audience, which is generally permitted.

What’s the argument against televising trials?

Opponents of televising criminal trials argue that it creates numerous procedural difficulties that waste the court’s time and may prejudice the defendant. These include the necessity of judges monitoring the manner of the broadcasting. It is also difficult to sequester juries to prevent them from watching the trial on TV. Broadcasting trials makes it more difficult to impanel an impartial jury if a second trial is necessary. There is an increased need for marshals and being broadcast has a significant mental effect on witnesses, jurors, and court officers.

If criminal trials are televised then they become spectacles for the public and the solemnity and dignity of the judiciary will be compromised for the sake of entertainment. For example, after an expert witness testified in Jodi Arias’ case, she was attacked online and the media coverage could have possibly swayed what weight was given to her testimony.

Televising the conduct of judges and lawyers creates a virtually universal conflict of interest within the court system. The Court’s officers will be tempted to consider their television appearance in addition to the needs of their client. It is even possible that a lawyer could weigh his interest in having an attractive TV appearance higher than his duty to his client. Lawyers may try risky strategies in order to impress a potential television market, and judges may behave in ways that are most conducive to their political aspirations even if they are not warranted by the law. If a highly controversial criminal trial (e.g. the George Zimmerman trial) is televised and the verdict is not popular with a significant portion of the public, then an officer of the court or juror could be a target of disgruntled viewers.

Conclusion

We now have the ability to broadcast basically whatever we want. Trials are public for the most part–family, friends, and others who know or do not know the parties are often able to go and observe the proceedings. Televising trials allows everyone to have that access to the justice system, and promotes transparency and understanding. That being said, broadcasting trials and the resulting media coverage and analysis could have potential to affect the trial itself. While justice may very well be blind–should our knowledge of court cases be? It’s not an easy question or an easy answer, but one that will have to be answered very soon.

Resources

Primary

U.S. Constitution: Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment

Second Circuit Court of Appeals: Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

United States Courts: Cameras in Courts

Maryland Courts: Report of the Committee to Study Extended Media Coverage of Criminal Trial Proceedings in Maryland

Supreme Court: Chandler v. Florida

Additional

RTDNA: Cameras in the Court: A State-by-State Guide

WJBO: Televise Criminal Trials? Of Course?

Guardian: Televising the Courts: the Time Has Come

Voice of America: Chinese Courts Put More Criminal Trials Online

Townhall: Say No to Televised Trial

CJ Online: Time to Tune Out Televised Trials

Debate: Should Criminal Trials be Televised?

DebateWise: Cameras in Courtrooms

Examiner: Zimmerman Case Coverage Highlights Flaws in Media

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Criminal Trials on TV: What’s the Verdict? appeared first on Law Street.

The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was a bill  proposed in Congress in 2011 that immediately made headlines because opponents argued that it was too restrictive and had the potential to hamper free speech. It did not end up passing, but the ideas and motivations behind it still remain up for debate. Read on to learn about SOPA, the legislative battles surrounding it, and where we stand now.

What was SOPA?

The provisions of the bill primarily included increased federal enforcement of copyright laws and increased government action against entities involved in copyright infringement. These provisions include allowing both the U.S. Department of Justice and private copyright holders to obtain injunctions against copyright infringement by foreign-based entities. The bill would have allowed the Justice Department to bar internet advertising networks and payment network providers from servicing infringing websites e.g. torrent websites, sites that allow streaming of copyrighted movies or TV shows, etc. SOPA also would have prevented search engines from providing links to those websites.

SOPA aimed to increase the criminal penalties infringers face under the law.  For example, the penalties for economic espionage would have been a maximum of 15-20 years imprisonment and fines up to $5 million. The bill would have increased the realm of copyright crimes to include those perpetrated by “electronic means.”  Criminal penalties would have increased for IP infringement of government information or infringement that results in harm to government personnel or interests.

SOPA also would have had major implications for IP civil jurisprudence. Private entities are given rights against infringers as well. If a private entity is damaged by infringement and wishes to exercise SOPA rights they could have sent written notification to payment agents and advertising networks connected with the alleged offending site who then have to inform them and cease service unless the alleged infringer can respond with a counter-notification, indicating that they are not infringing. The copyright holder would have been able to bring an action for injunctive relief against the infringing site’s owners if either a counter-notification was provided or payment networks continue serving the alleged infringer without a counter-notification. Applying SOPA rights to foreign sites would have required them to consent to U.S. jurisdiction to determine if they are dedicated to infringement.

What was the argument for SOPA?

Proponents of the bill believed that SOPA could have created a lot of benefits for the public. It created major difficulties for perpetrators of IP crime because it would have given private companies the means and authorization to enforce and protect their own intellectual property rights. This allowed IP crimes to be remedied more quickly and at a far lower cost to the public because it could be done without the time constraints and expense of adjudication. This would improve the economy by decreasing government spending on investigating and prosecuting IP crimes. The fear of facing civil litigation under SOPA and the strengthened criminal penalties would have created a strong disincentive for many forms of infringement. Furthermore, by hamstringing IP infringement SOPA would make the U.S. more attractive to authors and innovators and reinvigorate the economy with increased job creation.

What was the argument against SOPA?

Opponents highlighted SOPA’s drawbacks. Under the law, even when a valid counter-notification would have been sent, third-party servicers were not required to resume serving accused websites.  SOPA also insulated the third parties from all lawsuits except those initiated by the copyright holder.  Therefore, the law allowed and perhaps even incentivized companies to limit other companies’ legal and commercial rights without judicial oversight, leaving SOPA vulnerable to the objection that it violates individuals’ constitutional due process. Non-infringing companies may be damaged by having valuable business relationships taken away from them without a meaningful opportunity to be heard and without legal recourse. This is because even if a company is found to be non-infringing there is no requirement that the discontinued services be reinstated. Finally, SOPA would not have accounted for the proportionality of the alleged infringement relative to the alleged infringer’s website. For example, under SOPA if one person uploaded an allegedly infringing video on Facebook and the owner exercised his SOPA rights he could potentially bring SOPA action against Facebook in its entirety.

What happened with SOPA?

There was a lot of backlash against SOPA from high-profile and much-used websites. On a few different days websites blacked themselves out to protest SOPA. The blackouts not only called attention to the issue, but also served as a sort of warning to consumers that if they did not get involved in stopping SOPA, some of their favorite websites would be threatened. Participants included Wikipedia, WordPress, and BoingBoing. Eventually, SOPA ended up failing. There were attempts to revive it about a year later, but nothing really came of those.

SOPA is the perfect example of the disconnect between technology and the people making our laws. On paper the idea sounded good, but in practice there were significant problems with the proposed law. While the debate over copyright and technology is far from over, SOPA almost certainly is.

Resources

Primary

U.S. Constitution: Article I Section 8 of the United States Constitution

House of Representatives: H.R. 3261, the “Stop Online Piracy Act”

Additional

100gf: Why SOPA Might be the Best Thing That’s Ever Happened to the Internet

Vulture: Polone: Why I’m for SOPA, and How the Entertainment Industry Blew It

Venture Beat: Top 5 Reasons to Support SOPA

Cracked: The Only Argument on the Internet in Favor of SOPA

Washington Post: SOPA Died in 2012, But Obama Administration Wants to Revive Part of it

Mashable: Why SOPA is Dangerous

TechDirt: Supporters of SOPA/PIPA Make Arguments That Make No Sense

CDT: US Piracy Law Could Threaten Human Rights

SOPA Strike: Homepage

Christian Science Monitor: SOPA and PIPA Bills: Old Answers to 21st Century Problems

Masur Law: Summary of SOPA and PIPA

CNN: SOPA Explained: What it is and Why it Matters

NickEhrenberg: The Arguments For and Against SOPA/PIPA (and now CISPA)

PC World: SOPA Controversy Explained

John Gomis

John Gomis earned a Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School in June 2014 and lives in New York City. Contact John at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

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