A man who was under terror surveillance in Boston was shot and killed by a police officer and an FBI agent earlier this afternoon. This man was a part of a broader terrorism investigation involving suspected Islamist extremists. This man was identified as Usaama Rahim by a spokesperson for the Council of American-Islamic Relations.

The justification for the officials’ actions resulting in this man’s death focuses on their perceptions that Rahim was a threat to public safety, since he allegedly wielded a large, black knife at the time of the incident. According to CNN, Rahim was asked numerous times to drop his weapon but because he refused to do so both the police officer and FBI agent opened fire.

Police Commissioner William Evans claimed that “he came at the officers and, you know, they do what they were trained to do and, unfortunately, they had to take a life.”

This statement begs the question, both to Evans and to police departments everywhere, what type of situation justifies any police officers actions’ that result in the death of a man who hasn’t been proven guilty? This man was under terror surveillance, but considering the United States’ disputable track record on finding evidence regarding terrorist efforts, these actions could still be unconstitutional.

The Model Penal Code is normally used to guide the actions of police officers in assessing whether or not resorting to deadly force is the appropriate response in dangerous circumstances. According to the code, officers should only use force when the action will not endanger innocent bystanders, the suspect used deadly force in committing the crime, or the officers believe a delay in the arrest may harm other people. Deadly force is considered acceptable when it is believed to be the only solution to resolving a dangerous situation that could harm innocent bystanders.

In this particular shooting, killing Rahim could be justified by the police because he was wielding a large, black knife, forcing the officers to open fire. But is waving a knife, with no hostages and no bystanders in the immediate vicinity, a valid enough rationale to take someone’s life? Commissioner Evans claimed that Rahim came “within the proximity” for the officers to use deadly force. But what distance is considered within the proximity to kill? These are all questions that demand answers.

In addition to these questionable circumstances, Rahim was a suspected Islamic extremist under terror surveillance. The FBI agent who participated in the shooting was surely aware of this fact, but the same cannot be said for the Boston police officer. Rahim’s identity as a Muslim cannot be ignored when evaluating the police officer and FBI agent’s justifications for their actions. The lethal combination of Rahim’s Muslim faith and questionable terrorist ties could easily work in the police department’s favor. At the time of his death, Rahim had not been convicted of any terrorist actions, so his death at the hands of Boston and federal officials should not be considered constitutional.

Racial or ethnic profiling may have been a factor in this shooting as well. It is also noteworthy that this case occurred just over two years after the Boston Bombing, which has had a lasting (and justified) impact on perceptions of terrorist attacks throughout the U.S. Although news sources have not yet revealed why Rahim was under surveillance, a mere suspicion that he was involved with terrorist activity does not legitimize his death.

One of the most prevalent issues in holding the police officer and FBI agent accountable in this situation is the complex relationship between the police department and judicial court system. In the 1930 Iowa case of Klinkel v. Saddler, a sheriff faced a lawsuit because he had killed a misdemeanor suspect during an arrest. His defense was that he had used deadly force “to defend himself.” The court ruled in his favor. This case set precedent for lax rulings in favor of police officers, despite the officer’s controversial actions.

This storyline coincides with other court cases of police officers claiming self defense after having killed a subject of an arrest, such as Tamir Rice and Michael Brown. All of these incidents speak to the larger problem of police officers abusing their position of authority and power at the expense of civilians.

Police departments need to undergo reformation, especially regarding their veracious use of deadly force. Regardless of whether or not Rahim was guilty of the things he was suspected of doing, there were presumably ways to detain him without taking his life. Whether it be using a gun, rough rides, or chokeholds, police departments must develop new tactics that put deadly force at the bottom of the totem pole, thereby protecting citizens instead of victimizing them.

Emily Dalgo also contributed to this story.

Sarina Neote

Sarina Neote is a member of the American University Class of 2017. Contact Sarina at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post The Boston Police Shooting of Usaama Rahim: Protection or Victimization? appeared first on Law Street.

In Colombia a violent conflict has been raging for more than 50 years. This conflict has pitted the nation’s government against a rebel–possibly terrorist–group known as FARC. With the struggle surpassing the half-century mark, both sides have been willing to return to the negotiating table to give peace yet another chance. However, the process is once again under the threat of unraveling due to a familiar cycle of FARC ambushes and government reprisals. Read on to learn about the conflict’s history, previous efforts at peace, other groups and issues in play, and whether this round of negotiations is likely to actually result in peace for the embattled nation.

History of the Conflict

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) earliest origins can be traced all the way back to the late 1940s and 50s. During this time, the two major political parties in Colombia–the Liberals and the Conservatives–were locked in a brutal civil war for control of the country. The conflict left more than 300,000 people dead. Following the end of the war, the Conservatives took control of the government and barred many of their Liberal opponents from participating, in effect marginalizing them. Several groups emerged as a reaction. One of these groups was led by Manuel Marulanda, who founded the FARC’s precursor, the Marquetalia Republic, and was the first leader of FARC as well. This group began arming and organizing in the mountains.

In 1964, the government launched an attack on this organization, quickly routing them. However, Marulanda escaped along with several followers. Before fleeing he and other group leaders agreed to the Agrarian Program of the Guerillas, basically FARC’s constitution, which created roles within the group and a common strategy. This was followed up every two or four years by congresses where the group’s members would meet to discuss new policies.

A seminal moment was reached at one such conference in 1982, when members became determined to solidify their control in the mountainous regions and also begin to expand their influence into cities with the ultimate goal of taking the capital. In the ensuing years, particularly from the 1990s to the early 2000s, the group engaged in several high profile and ostentatious attacks on police, soldiers, villagers, rival groups, and even a presidential inauguration.

Ideology and Perception

FARC was founded on a Marxist-Leninist ideology. The group claims to represent the lower class of the country, namely the poor and farmers, who it feels are being oppressed by the government. It also opposes the opening up of the country to foreign interests, particularly American corporations, which it views as imperialistic.

However, while FARC espouses a high-minded ideology, its actions are less than noble. In fact the group has been designated a terrorist organization by a number of countries including the U.S. This is due in part to the group’s tactics, ranging the whole violent gambit from murder to bombings. With its base in Colombia, as well as its presence in Ecuador, Panama, Brazil, Venezuela, and Peru, the group launches attacks usually within its own territory as well as outside raids to obtain supplies. These attacks generally target military personnel and foreigners, however a large number of civilians have been caught in the cross fire.

FARC’s Power Base

While its commitment to Marxist-Leninism is dubious, so too are the ways the group generates its funding. Much of the wealth created by FARC has been through practices such as kidnapping, extortion, and cocaine trafficking. In fact, estimates for the amount of money FARC earned from the cocaine trade range from $220 million to $3.5 billion. FARC has also, recently, added the ignominious task of illegal gold mining to this grim list.

Additionally, the group has allegedly received support from like minded and sympathetic governments in Venezuela and Ecuador. According to documents the Colombian military claims it seized in a raid against FARC in Ecuador in 2008, then-Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez had given the group $300 million. While Chavez denied the allegations, these countries have been open to FARC in response to U.S. support of the Colombian government.

So Close Yet So Far Away

The current peace negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government are not the first attempts at a détente. In fact they are far from it–attempts to broker peace between the two sides have gone on almost as long as the fighting. The first efforts came in 1984 when, as part of Uribe Accords, FARC agreed to stop the kidnappings and the government pushed the group to channel its energy into legitimate political movements. Although the ceasefire ultimately did not hold and the group continued fighting, it did lead to the Patriotic Union and the Colombian Communist Party. These were the legitimate government parties associated with the FARC, similar to Hamas in Palestine or Sinn Fein in Ireland.

These talks failed however, because FARC’s political candidates, though successful, were repeatedly murdered by right-wing paramilitary groups. Additionally no demands of a ceasefire were ever made on behalf of the government.

The next major effort came in 1998, when then-President Andres Pastrana once again agreed to provide FARC with a demilitarized zone from which to operate. However, this move backfired as FARC capitalized on the temporary weakness of the government to recollect itself militarily, launch attacks, grow coca, and kidnap officials. Nevertheless, this lack of commitment on behalf of FARC may have ushered in its own decline, as it led to a backlash in which the citizenry called for a tougher stand against the rebels. This was carried out by then-incoming President Álvaro Uribe.

The latest round of peace negotiations began secretly in Cuba. When preliminary agreements were reached, another round was proposed to be conducted in Norway, with final negotiations returning to Cuba. As part of this agreement, several reforms passed aimed at compensating victims and pardoning FARC members. The discussions themselves centered on six points. These points included rural development and land policy; the political participation of FARC; ending the conflict and reinserting FARC members back into civilian life; the end to cultivation of illicit crops and drug trafficking; reparations for victims; and lastly the implementation of these agreed-upon measures once the negotiations had concluded.

So far tentative agreements have been reached on three of the issues, although nothing is finalized until the whole process has been implemented. These three points were land redistribution, the role in civil society for demobilized FARC members, and putting an end to the illicit growing of crops used for the drug trade. However, the negotiations were temporarily put on hold when FARC kidnapped three high-ranking military officers. They were eventually released and talks resumed.

The discussions have once more been put under pressure, with the attacks on soldiers as well as a raid that killed one of the FARC negotiators. The ceasefire has also been lifted by the government and airstrikes against rebel positions have begun once more. Despite this pressure though, talks have continued in Cuba.

Other Players in Colombia

Along with FARC there are several other groups at work. These groups can be divided into left wing, of which FARC is one, and right wing, which generally oppose FARC at all levels.

Leftists

While FARC may be the largest and most infamous group in Colombia, it is far from the only one. Another Leftist group in the country is the ELN or National Liberation Army. The ELN formed at the same time as FARC, however its membership was comprised chiefly of students, Catholics, and intellectuals who were more focused on replicating a Castro-style revolution. While the groups have similar beginnings and ideologies, ELN is focused more in urban areas as opposed to the rural locations FARC dominates. Despite these similarities however, the groups have clashed directly. ELN, like FARC, is also listed as a terrorist organization, according to the U.S. State Department.

Both of these groups have operated under the larger Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Group, an umbrella organization for left-wing organizations. Along with FARC and ELN, M-19 and EPL also worked under this designation. M-19, or the April 19^th movement, was FARC’s attempt at an urban organization. However, this group ultimately broke away and became independent. EPL was another aggressive communist group that was eventually weakened by FARC attacks.

Leftist groups such as these both help and hurt FARC’s position. By existing and making similar demands they reveal to the government the reality of problems such as poverty, which can be more easily dismissed if they are only discussed by one group with a controversial past. On the other side, they can be harmful by splintering the potential support base for FARC and directly undermining the group when they engage in internal conflicts that can create more violence.

Right-Wing Paramilitaries

While leftist groups formed in reaction to the conservative government,right-wing groups formed in response to organizations such as FARC. These started out small in the 1960s as local self-defense groups authorized by Colombia’s Congress.

Eventually they consolidated into the AUC or United Self Defense Forces of Colombia. This was essentially a holding company paramilitary group, created and funded by rich farmers and narcotics traffickers to protect these people and their interests from FARC and like-minded organizations. This group was very strong and its membership ranged from 8,000 to 20,000 members. Additionally, while there was never any admitted connections between these groups and the government, it has been widely speculated that the administration often looked the other way or even funded the operations. Although the group was disbanded in 2006 and its leaders pardoned, many of its former members are suspected of continuing to operate in the drug trade and other criminal operations. This group was also considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government until 2014.

These right-wing para-military groups have a dual effect on FARC. On one side they show the violence perpetrated against the group, often at the behest of the government or powerful individuals, which can further justify FARC’s cause. Conversely they are actively trying to destroy FARC and have seen a certain degree of success. In either case, they have ratcheted up the violence and created a culture of fear and mistrust. They also make FARC less likely to come to the peace table because they are seen as the secret hand of the government.

Economics and Legacy

Decline of FARC

While securing peace with FARC is still an important goal, its importance has diminished over time. This is partly due to economics, as in 2012 a free trade agreement between Colombia and the U.S. went into effect, making the allies that much closer. Additionally, the economy of Colombia has continued to grow despite the fighting, averaging nearly 6 percent growth a year. In individual terms this has meant the average income per person has gone from $5800 dollars in 2000 to $10,000 in 2011.

The effect of this is two fold. For a government weary of fighting and eager to shine on the global stage, defeating or at least containing FARC would allow it to focus more on improving its economy and the well being of its citizens. Additionally, an improved standard of living would also seem to undermine the very existence of FARC as the group was originally supposedly founded on the idea of protecting and standing up for underrepresented groups, namely the peasants.

FARC also appears to be declining. In 2001, the group was believed to have as many as 16,000 members; that number has recently dwindled to as few as 6,000 to 8,000. This has been the result of an intensified campaign by former President Uribe, whose father was murdered by FARC in a kidnapping attempt. Aside from decreased membership, the leadership of FARC has also been hit hard. After its founder died of a heart attack in 2008, his second in command was subsequently killed in the raid in Ecuador. Other leaders have also been killed. Desertion has become a problem as well as some fighters, who were attracted by noble ideas, have become jaded by the drug trafficking and perpetual violence.

Legacy

So what legacy does FARC leave behind? In terms of numbers, over 220,000 people have been killed as a result of fighting between the group and the government since its inception. Additionally, much of the popular support once enjoyed by FARC has eroded, as people have become exhausted with the conflict and simply want a better life. Most of the territory once held by FARC has also been lost as a result of the increased military efforts on behalf of the government. Thus, FARC’s strength and importance has been greatly reduced. Still, an agreement between the group and the government would be a major step in rebuilding the war-torn nation.

Conclusion

The most recent round of talks between Colombia and FARC offer a glimmer of hope. But this hope can only be achieved if both sides stop committing the same perpetual violent acts that have spawned this conflict in the first place. Nevertheless, if the last few month’s actions are any indication, this is not going to happen.

This presents a challenge to both sides. On one side, FARC is a diminished organization that faces enemies on all sides and has few friends. The government, meanwhile, clearly wants to capitalize on economic growth and turn the page on the history of drug violence and terrorist insurgencies. Both of these goals can be accomplished, but the two sides have to come to terms and end a destructive conflict that has lasted for more than 50 years.

Resources

Primary

Congressional Research Service: Peace Talks in Colombia

Additional

Stanford University: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army

Council on Foreign Relations: FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left Wing Guerillas

BBC News: Colombian FARC Negotiator Killed in Bombing Raid

Institute of the Americas: Colombia Pushes Back Cartels, Terrorists to Become Economic Powerhouse

Al Jazeera: Profile: The FARC

Ploughshares: Colombia

Michael Sliwinski

Michael Sliwinski (@MoneyMike4289) is a 2011 graduate of Ohio University in Athens with a Bachelor’s in History, as well as a 2014 graduate of the University of Georgia with a Master’s in International Policy. In his free time he enjoys writing, reading, and outdoor activites, particularly basketball. Contact Michael at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post FARC: Preventing Peace in Colombia? appeared first on Law Street.

On Thursday April 2, a number of gunmen burst into a college in Garissa, Kenya. These attackers proceeded to separate the sleeping students into groups. They then executed 147 people, leaving a trail of carnage for the world to see. Carried out by Al Shabab, the attack targeting Kenyan Christians was another in a series of skirmishes between the group and Kenyan citizens. Read on to learn about the roots of conflict, what Al Shabab is, why the attack occurred, and considerations for the Kenyan people moving forward.

 A Brief Look at Kenyan History

Prior to contact from outside groups, modern day Kenya was home to several different indigenous tribes. However, this way of life began to change with the incursions first of Arabs and later Christian Europeans. These groups brought two different religions, Islam and Christianity, which would create lasting divisions and serve as a root cause for friction in the present day.

Islam

Islam reached Kenya first as a result of trade with Arab merchants, but also stemmed from the Oman Sultanate whose power emanated from Zanzibar, an island off the coast of Kenya. Not surprisingly then, along the coast many Kenyans became Muslims. Presently about 11 percent of the population of Kenya is Muslim. Today the Muslim population remains centered along the coast and in the north, along the border with Somalia.

Christianity

Christianity arrived much later, in the nineteenth century. British colonization led to the rise of Christianity in Kenya. Starting with its land grabs, the Christian faith accompanied every expansion of the British presence in Kenya, culminating in its colonial status. Along with British officials, missionaries also worked to spread the faith throughout the country. Despite these efforts, Christianity was still second to the traditional beliefs of Kenya. Even for those who accepted Christianity, for many it took the form of a blend of traditional practices and the Christian faith. However, following independence, the new ruling elite adopted Christianity and thus made it the de facto religion of the nation. Today, approximately 82 percent of the population of Kenya is some form of Christian. The accompanying video explains the settling of Kenya, the arrivals of Arab and European colonists, and Kenya’s arrival at independence:

 Kenya and Somalia

While the situation within Kenya is complex, matters are also complicated with its neighbors, especially with the nation to the north, Somalia. The attack in Garissa came after continued Kenyan intervention into Somalia, dating back to 2011. The incursion was triggered by a raid into Kenya by the terror group Al Shabab.

Al Shabab

The group claiming responsibility for the attack in Garissa is a Somali-based Islamist extremist group known as Al Shabab, which means “the youth” in Arabic. The Al-Qaeda linked group was the youth movement of the Union of Islamic Courts which controlled Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, until it was ousted by Ethiopian forces in 2006. While the group has lost control over major areas, including Mogadishu and the port city Kismayo, it still maintains a grip over a large swath of territory within Somalia, despite continued efforts of African Union troops. Within the territory under its control, Al Shabab practices an extremist form of Islam.

The attack on Garissa carried out by A Shabab was unquestionably grisly, however it was not the first. Rather, it was one in a long series of escalating assaults against Kenya. Prior to the attack on the university, one of the worst terrorist attacks in Kenya was also courtesy of Al Shabab. That attack occurred at a shopping mall in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, and left 68 people dead. There are many other incidents of gun or grenade attacks carried out by the group. One of the chilling hallmarks of these attacks is Al Shabab forcing people to correctly recite specific passages of the Koran in order to separate the Christians from Muslims. Although Kenya recently invaded Somalia to confront the group, these attacks precipitated that invasion, which begs the question, why is Al Shabab targeting Kenya?  The video below explains what Al Shabab is and its goals in Kenya:

Kenyan Intervention

Al Shabab seemingly initiated the mass killings in part because of Kenya’s invasion of Somalia as well as how Kenya deals with its Muslim minority population. Kenya began a direct military intervention into Somalia in 2011 along with fellow African nations to root out Al Shabab, whose kidnappings and killings Kenya claimed hurt the country economically. However, there has been a history of raids from Al Shabab into Kenya, so many experts attributed the invasion to Kenya’s increased militarization, courtesy of growing military assistance packages from the United States. Additionally, Kenya had also previously trained and armed a militia group to serve as a buffer between itself and Al Shabab in the northern border region.

Aside from direct military conflict with Al Shabab, another reason for the attack was how Kenya treats its own Muslim population. Muslims make up around 11 percent of the population of Kenya and are based mostly in the northern and coastal regions that border Somalia. This area has historically been marginalized, resulting in a lack of services, jobs, and representation in the government. It has also been the recipient of anger from Kenyan armed forces for attacks on Kenyan territory. In 1984 for example, over 1000 people were murdered by Kenyan troops in Wagalla, located in the predominately Muslim north, in an attempt to end clan conflict.

Current Situation in Kenya

So what’s next for Kenya following this massacre? On April 6, just four days after the deadly attack on the university in Garissa, Kenya launched airstrikes on suspected Al Shabab militants. While officials say the strikes were already planned and were not a direct result of the Garissa carnage, the timing is questionable. However, some are questioning what exactly Kenya hopes to achieve with the strikes, other than killing a few insurgents. As Al Shabab is already reeling from attacks in Somalia, critics worry that it would appear wiser to try to better incorporate the Muslim population in Kenya and thus eliminate the recruiting ground for the terrorist group there. As Hunter S. Thompson immortally once said, “kill the body and the head will die.”

Nevertheless, despite whatever path Kenya takes, the attacks by Al Shabab appear to point to a larger trend conflict in the area–the overall struggle taking place in central and northern Africa and the Middle East, between states and extremist groups. These efforts are spearheaded historically by Al Qaeda, but more recently by ISIS in Iraq and Syria and Boko Haram in Nigeria. The question going forward then, is what links these groups may have to aiding Al Shabab?

Al Shabab has already begun working, at least in minor ways, with Boko Haram. In fact the two groups have communicated since 2011 about bombing plans and other tactics. Even the situation in the two countries are similar–Nigeria is plagued by a Islamic extremist group representing a northern region populated by Muslims who feel oppressed and marginalized by the existing governments. Continued and increased cooperation between the terror groups have many worried about even worse attacks than the Garissa massacre, if underlying problems within Kenya are not addressed and the Al Shabab is not successfully countered.

 Conclusion

Kenya currently faces a difficult road, but not necessarily a unique one. Kenya is now embroiled in a seemingly endless conflict with a prominent non-state actor, Al Shabab. Kenya may need to unite its own people more closely, and not just through airstrikes. This sentiment seemed to be shared by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in an address to the nation on Easter Sunday, in which he called for national unity and defended Islam as a religion of peace. The issue now, is whether Kenya can abide by Kenyatta’s words and unite to defeat the terror that has infiltrated it.

Resources

Foreign Relations: Why Kenya Invaded Somalia

CNN: 147 Dead, Islamist Gunmen Killed After Attack at Kenyan College

Index Mundi: Kenya’s Demographic Profile

BBC News: Who are Somalia’s Al Shabab?

Al Jazeera: Why Al Shabab has Gained a Foothold in Kenya

CNN: Kenya Airstrikes on Al Shabaab Targets Unrelated to Garissa Attacks, Source Says

Good Reads: Quotes

DW: Islamist Terror Groups in Africa and the Middle East

Horseed Media: Somalia Al Shabab Leaders in Squabble over Joining IS

NBC News: Missing Nigeria School Girls

Think Progress: Deadly University Attack Hangs Over Kenya’s Easter Sunday

Danish Institute for International Studies: Political Islam in Kenya

Michael Sliwinski

Michael Sliwinski (@MoneyMike4289) is a 2011 graduate of Ohio University in Athens with a Bachelor’s in History, as well as a 2014 graduate of the University of Georgia with a Master’s in International Policy. In his free time he enjoys writing, reading, and outdoor activites, particularly basketball. Contact Michael at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Garissa Massacre: Al Shabab’s Role in Kenya appeared first on Law Street.

Much of the world reacted on Tuesday, horrified, as ISIS released a video of a Jordanian pilot burned alive. The pilot was named Lieutenant Moath al-Kasasbeh, a member of the Royal Jordanian Air Force, and only 27 years old. He went missing in December in a mission against ISIS, and was captured by the terrorist organization.

Do not share the monstrous pics of Moath Al-Kasasbeh’s death, let’s remember the pilot for his smile.. #IAmMoathpic.twitter.com/FqekJBfhdz

— Waleed Abu Nada (@waleedabunada) February 3, 2015

ISIS had threatened his death in a supposed sort-of ransom letter to Jordan: the country could either bring terrorist Sajida al-Rishawi to a given place by January 29, or al-Kasasbeh would be killed. Jordan didn’t give in to the demands, saying that it couldn’t release the terrorist unless it was sure that al-Kasasbeh was alive, although Jordanian officials talked openly about releasing al-Rishawi under the right conditions. There was a lot of back and forth, and for a time it looked like Jordan’s negotiations might be effective. Unfortunately, the terms were never met, and the video of al-Kasasbeh’s death was released Tuesday night.

Just a few days before al-Kasasbeh was killed, ISIS killed Japanese journalist Kenji Goto. Like al-Kasasbeh, news of Goto’s kiling was released online in video form; however, unlike al-Kasasbeh, Goto was beheaded.

In response to al-Kasasbeh’s killing, Jordan killed two prisoners that it held. One was al-Rishawi, the woman whose release ISIS had demanded. She was a would-be suicide bomber who was involved in an attack on a wedding on November 9, 2005. The group she was with killed 58 people, but her vest failed to detonate. The other prisoner was Ziad Karbouli, who used to be an aide to the top al-Qaeda leader in Iraq.

My heart goes out to the families of al-Kasasbeh and Goto–they were sad, horrific casualties of a bloody and terrifying war. But my brain is left with an overwhelming question: what’s next? Jordan’s attempt at negotiations with ISIS didn’t work out, but what does that mean for other nations?

I was relatively young when 9/11 happened–at least young enough that most of my formal education as it relates to international affairs and politics occurred in a post-9/11 world. Since the War on Terrorism began, one of the most fundamental principles has been that we absolutely, under no circumstances, negotiate with terrorists. In the wake of the horrific killings of al-Kasasbeh and Goto, as well as the killing of Americans such as James Foley and Steven Sotloff, the question of what nations should do when their people are taken hostage by ISIS, or organizations like ISIS, is cloudier than it has ever been.

It’s by no means simple. First of all, the idea of negotiating with belligerents–not terrorists, necessarily, but state actors, isn’t similarly reviled. Wars can end in a few ways, one of which is by reaching an agreement or peace treaty. That seems straightforward enough–we may negotiate with recognized foreign governments, but not with terrorist groups. But remember the fact that until about 100 years ago, nations and their borders weren’t as concrete as they are now, and it becomes more complicated–the difference between the leader of a nation and of a group aren’t very black and white. Take, for example, the Taliban. When it ruled Afghanistan, was it a terror group, or a government? Or a little bit of both?

The truth is, we’ve been negotiating with, or at least attempting to negotiate with, terrorist groups for years–remember all the intricacies of the Iran-Contra affair? So, why are we so adamant about the fact that we don’t negotiate with terrorists? The Bowe Bergdahl scandal this summer, and the willingness of both sides to slam President Obama over his trade, showed that much of America still staunchly believes in that principle.

I want to be clear here, I’m not saying we should negotiate with terrorists. But I think that the question of how to deal with ISIS is more nuanced than a political buzz-phrase. The negotiations between Jordan and ISIS show just how complicated it really is, and how while the “war on terror” is not necessarily over, a look at our tactics may be in order.

Anneliese Mahoney

Anneliese Mahoney is Managing Editor at Law Street and a Connecticut transplant to Washington D.C. She has a Bachelor’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University, and a passion for law, politics, and social issues. Contact Anneliese at amahoney@LawStreetMedia.com.

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