The NCAA’s amateurism rule is rubbish. On its website, the college athletics governing body claims it has “adopted amateurism rules to ensure the students’ priority remains on obtaining a quality educational experience and that all of student-athletes are competing equitably.” The page goes on to list all the things student athletes are not allowed to do under the principle of amateurism, including:

1. Salaries for participating in athletics;
2. Contracts with professional teams;
3. Benefits from an agent or a prospective agent;
4. Agreement to be represented by an agent; and
5. Tryouts, practice, or competition with a professional team.

In the meantime, the University of Texas basketball program collected more than $165 million in revenue for the 2013-2014 season, according to the Office of Postsecondary Education. Forbes values its football program at a cool $139 million, while the NCAA as a whole made nearly $913 million for the fiscal year 2013.

If the NCAA is starting to sound like a cartel, that’s because it is. By definition, a cartel is an agreement between competing firms to fix prices. A long time ago, colleges got together and decided not to pay players, fixing the salaries of their student-athlete employees at zero for the benefit of NCAA and participating universities’ leadership.

So then, it becomes evident that the NCAA needs to get rid of its amateurism rule. Fortunately, the rule is already under assault in the court room.

In a March 2014 National Labor Relations Board decision, Regional Director Peter Sung Ohr ruled that a group of Northwestern University football players are eligible to form a union on the basis that players devote as many as 50 hours a week to football, and that scholarships, which can be terminated yea to year and require student athletes to adhere to certain guidelines, are a contract for compensation.

In an August 2014 California District Court decision, Judge Claudia Wilken ruled that “NCAA rules unreasonably restrain trade in the market for certain educational and athletic opportunities offered by NCAA Division I schools” in a case involving a former UCLA basketball star who claimed the NCAA and EA Sports violated his right to use his image for marketing purposes when his image was used in a video game without his consent and without compensation.

Nevertheless, there are numerous arguments against compensating student athletes.

Some argue that a vast majority of athletic programs at universities are losing money and need help from their basketball and football programs to stay afloat. Compensating student athletes, they contend, will force athletic departments across the country to cut programs.

Tough luck. We live in a capitalist society where businesses close every day because they fail to make a profit. If a university believes that maintaining these programs leads to more donations from alumni, fine, fund them through donations. But student athletes contributing to profitable programs should not be punished for the financial woes of their unprofitable counterparts.

Others argue that scholarships reasonably compensate student athletes.

No, they don’t. In a Drexel University and National College Players Association study, the average Division I college basketball player would earn $266,000 per year, and the average Division I football player would earn $114,000 per year, if players received 50 percent of the revenue earned by their respective programs, which is approximately the revenue sharing model of the NBA and NFL.

Still, others argue that high school athletes have the right to decide whether or not they want to accept a scholarship and be bound by NCAA regulations.

Well, the NBA enforces a 19-year age minimum for draftees, and the NFL requires its draftees to be three years removed from high school. With the emergence of European and Chinese leagues, some high school basketball stars have opted to spend their last years of ineligibility abroad. With no comparable foreign football leagues, football stars are out of luck.

There is yet another denomination of people who argue that the NFL’s three-year rule protects young athletes who are more susceptible to injuries such as concussions.

In most states, minors become legal adults at the age of 18, and the legal age of consent is 16. High school football players are well aware of the risks associated with playing the sport, and they should have the option to get paid millions of dollars to take on the higher risks of playing professionally with better athletes, or receive scholarships and develop their skills in a less physical college setting.

Consequently, the most sensible solution to the NCAA amateurism problem is for the NBA and NFL to eliminate their age requirements. Unfortunately, college athletics function as a phenomenal developmental league for professional leagues that professional franchises do not have to pay for.

So, as long as these age requirements are in place, amateurism in college athletics is dead. The NCAA needs to stop pretending that its student athletes are students first, athletes second, and open up its leagues to all the intricacies of the free market.

Doing so may involve sports agents that specialize in college athletes, or a free agency period where eligible players can transfer to other universities. The market will invariably take many twists and turns before it settles into a final model, but it will certainly be better than a system in which a cartel blatantly exploits the services of helpless college athletes.

Hyunjae Ham

Hyunjae Ham is a member of the University of Maryland Class of 2015 and a Law Street Media Fellow for the Summer of 2015. Contact Hyunjae at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

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On August 20, 5 million people tuned in to watch a summer baseball game, a pretty impressive figure considering MLB playoffs don’t begin until October. Now consider that those numbers aren’t for major league baseball or even college, but for little league baseball. Last Wednesday, 13-year-old Mo’ne Davis and her Philadelphia team battled and lost admirably to their Las Vegas counterpart, the latest event in a string of brushes with early fame. Sports fans and parents alike seem to endorse little league baseball, but one has to wonder: in an age when amateurism is being redefined at the collegiate level, will the public ever find little league baseball to be exploitative?

Like college football, little league baseball has seen a relatively quick surge in revenue. In 2012, even before Mo’ne Davis took America by storm, Little League Inc. had assets of nearly $85 million. Also like college football, the players are not the ones collecting the revenue. A majority of the revenue generated is used to maintain the Little League headquarters in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, as well as the domestic regional offices and the international facilities in Canada, Hong Kong, and Poland.

As the NCAA can attest, if organizational revenue increases from television contracts while players remain unpaid, some may declare the league exploitative. But Little League, Inc. can rest assured knowing its players won’t be seeking the same redress as current or former college athletes. For starters, Little League, Inc. hasn’t sold its athletes’ rights to merchandisers. The NCAA did, and that was generally what the recently decided O’Bannon v. NCAA was all about.

Secondly, the best college athletes not only earn their organizations money, they do so in lieu of their own earnings. Star athletes in basketball, football, hockey, and baseball often choose between college or receiving compensation from a domestic or foreign league. In 2008, NBA point guard Brandon Jennings chose to play professional basketball in Italy rather than play college basketball in the U.S. Mo’ne Davis et al., as entertaining as they may be, do not have similar opportunities considering minors lack the traditional capacity to contract in the United States, and child labor, even in Europe, is frowned upon.

Although it shouldn’t worry about being sued by its players, Little League Inc. might have to worry about its volunteers. Behind the play of child stars stands 1.25 million non-paid volunteers who ensure little league games are run effectively. Think it’s unlikely they would sue after volunteering to work for no money? So too, most likely, did Major League Baseball. So too, most likely, did several media giants in NYC.

Can all volunteers now sue their “employer,” even if it’s a non-profit? Is anything keeping Americorps and Salvation Army volunteers from suing those establishments? Not exactly. The Southern District of New York held fairly recently in a suit brought by Fox Searchlight Studio interns that the unpaid’s legal status generally depends on the motivation of the organization using them. Fox was found to be using interns in lieu of employees, and it was mainly to benefit them financially rather than offer experience to the interns. If Little League, Inc. keeps expanding its volunteer base in order to continue generating revenue, then it too may be thrown a curve ball.

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Andrew Blancato (@BigDogBlancato) holds a J.D. from New York Law School, and is a graduate of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. When he’s not writing, he is either clerking at a trial court in Connecticut, or obsessing over Boston sports.

Featured image courtesy of [Edwin Martinez via Flickr]

Andrew Blancato

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The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has ruled college athletics in a manner that would make dictators green with envy, and each decade under its rule seemed to indicate the increased power they’ve gained. In 1976 the association was entrusted with the authority to penalize schools directly. In 1988, the Supreme Court held that despite its quasi-governmental makeup, the NCAA was not a state actor and therefore need not provide procedural due process. Throughout the nineties and into the present day, the NCAA brokered broadcasting deals for more and more money, resulting in a body that generated more than $750 million as of 2013.  But as any powerful politician knows, you can’t stay on top forever.

On August 8, 2014, Judge Claudia Wilken of the Northern District of California held in O’Bannon vs. NCAA that the NCAA’s current structure violates federal antitrust law. Specifically, Judge Wilken found that the NCAA can’t forbid schools from providing marginal compensation to their student athletes. For now, the ruling only approves of a $5,000 yearly allowance to an eligible NCAA basketball or football player’s trust fund. But the old guard should be nervous, as this decision is just one of several recent (and well-designed) attempts to wrestle power away from the NCAA. Earlier this year, Northwestern University football players successfully petitioned the NLRB to form a players union. Around the same time, famed labor lawyer Jeffrey Kessler filed suit against the NCAA, which essentially seeks to remove all caps on a college athlete’s earning capacity. Some journalists have indicated this is the beginning of the endfor the NCAA, but if that’s so, what lies ahead?

The good news is that courts are unlikely to reverse the advances made by the students. The NCAA has already indicated its plan to appeal O’Bannon, but since the Ninth Circuit is generally labor friendly, it’s unlikely the decision will be overturned at the next stage.

A reversal at the Supreme Court isn’t likely either. Despite a recent trend of being generally unfriendly to labor (e.g., this and this), SCOTUS is unlikely to decide O’Bannon purely on employment/labor law grounds. O’Bannon is an antitrust case, and plaintiffs in antitrust cases generally argue to oust a singular bully and restore free market principles. This is a notion most friends-of-management favor, perhaps especially in the Supreme Court’s case considering they’ve restored free market principles against the NCAA in the past.

The bad news for the student-athlete revolution is that their respective schools may have conflicting interests, and they may continue to thwart any effort to provide meaningful pay to students. Not too long ago the NCAA attempted to pass a resolution whereby student-athletes would get a stipend in addition to their scholarships. The schools, not the NCAA, pushed back against the idea.  Essentially, the schools that generated less sports-related revenue believed they would be unfairly burdened if they were forced to offer stipends in equal proportion to money makers like Texas and Wisconsin, especially after considering Title IX funding requirements.

Okay, so tax-paying Americans live with a progressive income tax rather than a flat tax, why can’t NCAA schools construct something similar with regard to student-athlete trust funds? Because the aforementioned money makers in college sports are already positioning themselves to avoid it. The day before the O’Bannon decision came down, the NCAA voted to allow the richest schools in D-I sports to have more autonomy. The autonomy could enable big schools to provide their students with more financial aid and could allow students to receive money through other pursuits (something former Colorado receiver Jeremy Bloom would have enjoyed).

The possible downside to the autonomy is that it becomes less likely the richest schools would be forced to comply with a graduated trust fund plan akin to a progressive tax. The richest schools would pay their recruits what they wanted, while the less-flush schools would be forced to pay the same amount, or risk losing even more recruits to bigger schools. This dichotomy could widen the income gap between large and small schools.

So why would the NCAA do this? Because the NCAA was a puppet government all along, man. Unlike sports oligarch FIFA, the NCAA doesn’t have a lot of disposable income. Ninety-six percent of its annual revenue is returned to charter schools, which is disproportionately given to the moneymakers of football and basketball. This money, AKA leverage, forced the hands of the NCAA and smaller schools to vote for the power-five conference autonomy, because they were scared the big schools would split off and create their own league.

In sum, the students won the day on August 8, but the real war could pit wealthy schools against not-so-wealthy schools. And in the end, the tyranny felt under the NCAA may not compare to the misery that the students and administrators of less fortunate schools feel when they try to compete against the power brokers of college sports. But ya know, viva la revolution.

Andrew Blancato

The post Watch the Throne: Who Succeeds if the NCAA Loses Power? appeared first on Law Street.

When Jabbar Collins was arrested in 1994 for the murder of Rabbi Abraham Pollack, no one believed him when he said he was innocent. Now, after 16 years in a maximum security prison and three years following his exoneration, Collins is slated to receive $3 million from the state of New York in one of the largest wrongful conviction settlements ever awarded by the state.

Collins is one of the lucky ones. Only 30 states and the District of the Columbia provide compensation to exonerated criminals. A total of 1,405 innocent people have been wrongfully imprisoned since 1989. In 46 percent of these cases, the government and its officials were at fault. Official misconduct (police, prosecutors, or other government officials abusing their power) is responsible for putting 647 innocent people behind bars over the past 25 years. Despite these numbers, the road to compensation is far from easy.

Even in the states that have compensation laws on the books, the process for receiving money is fairly difficult, requiring years of waiting and expensive legal battles. On average there is a minimum of a three year wait (as in Collins’ case). Additionally, a successful lawsuit depends on the person’s ability to prove that their wrongful conviction was caused by intentional misconduct. This requires naming a responsible party such as a prosecutor, police officer, or witness. It also excludes compensation for legal technicalities and unintentional errors made during the original investigation and trial.

If that isn’t bad enough, compensation laws vary widely state-by-state, and most of the money that exonerees receive is taxed. Some states deny compensation to any exoneree that falsely confessed or pleaded guilty, while others deny money to those who were exonerated without the use of DNA testing. Florida refuses to compensate anyone that has an unrelated prior offense under its “clean hands” provision, and Montana offers no money at all, instead offering educational aid for state or community college. New Hampshire offers a flat maximum of $20,000 no matter how many years an exoneree spent wrongfully imprisoned.

According to federal standards, exonerees should receive up to $50,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment and $100,000 per year spent on death row, but these standards are currently met by only 5 states. More often than not, exonerees receive small amounts–if anything at all–which do not even begin to cover the damages they suffered as a direct result of their wrongful confinement.

One thing that all exonerees almost uniformly receive is the horrific experience of being falsely imprisoned. Most suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, institutionalization, and depression as a result of years they spent behind bars. They have to endure the censure for a crime they never committed and the psychological damage of being branded a criminal by the public.

Even after an exoneree is released from confinement, the consequences of their imprisonment has the potential to taint every aspect of their lives. For some exonerees, half a lifetime has passed them by; family members have died, children have grown up, and spouses have moved on with their lives while they spent years behind bars. Others suffer physically from years spent with sub-par prison health care, while others suffer professionally as they lack the job experience, vocational training, and educational skills that are needed to secure a job.

Perhaps worst of all is the fact that their wrong conviction is not even immediately expunged from their records upon exoneration and release, often appearing on background checks and inhibiting their ability to fully reintegrate into society years later. Despite all this, most states do not provide transitional services for exonerees, leaving a large portion without a means of transportation, a source of income, or even a place to call home upon release.

It seems rather counter-intuitive to not provide these people with immediate and automatic compensation. They have clearly suffered unjustly at the hands of a flawed criminal justice system and it seems only natural that the government should take on the responsibility to help them rebuild their lives, regardless of liability.

The fact that these people are left with no other option but to sue for the compensation they rightfully deserve is adding insult to injury. They have already proved their innocence-they would be in jail otherwise–and while you cannot put a price on freedom, exonerees should not have to suffer through an expensive, protracted legal battle in order to be compensated for the years they spent unjustly serving time for a crime they did not commit.

[Innocence Project] [National Registry of Exonerations]

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Nicole Roberts (@NicoleR5901) a student at American University majoring in Justice, Law, and Society with a minor in Mandarin Chinese. She has a strong interest in law and policymaking, and is active in homeless rights advocacy as well as several other social justice movements. Contact Nicole at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

Featured image courtesy of [Luigi Caterino via Flickr]

Nicole Roberts

Nicole Roberts a student at American University majoring in Justice, Law, and Society with a minor in Mandarin Chinese. She has a strong interest in law and policymaking, and is active in homeless rights advocacy as well as several other social justice movements. Contact Nicole at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Compensation for Exonerees: A Fundamental Right? appeared first on Law Street.