While Iran has a parliament and president, like many western nations, its political structure is far more opaque. From the Supreme Leader to influential religious councils, understanding Iran’s leadership presents a challenge in and of itself. This challenge has been highlighted by a number of high profile events where it was unclear who had the final say in important Iranian policy decisions. Read on to learn how the Iran leadership was developed, how it is currently structured, and how that leadership defines itself both domestically and abroad.

The Revolution and Aftermath

The Iranian Revolution that occurred in 1979 was years in the making; its origins go back to at least to 1953. During that year, the CIA helped overthrow the recently elected prime minister in favor of the Shah, who had Western leanings and was an opponent of Soviet-style communism. While the Shah honored his loyalty to the United States, he was less kind to his own people, frequently imprisoning and even torturing those opposing him.

This set the stage for the revolution of 1979. This movement was led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who returned from Paris where he had been exiled during the Shah’s rise. In place of the Shah’s one-party government, the Ayatollah installed his own based on Islamic teachings, placing himself as the country’s Supreme Leader. The new emphasis on strict adherence to Islam meant a rollback on the Shah’s few, more liberal reforms concerning the economy and women’s rights.

The following video details the specifics of the Iranian Revolution:

The Shah, who had come to power following World War II, ruled as the head of a constitutional monarchy with himself as the final arbiter. When he was deposed by Khomeini the democratic institutions that had existed were kept, however, any power they had was drained. In the new system, Khomeini ruled as the unquestioned leader of his own government which focused heavily on instilling Islamic concepts and resisting interaction with Western nations he viewed as corrupting Iran. The next sections will detail the unelected and elected elements of Khomeini’s Iran and how they are structured so that his power is virtually unchallenged.

Unelected Officials

Similar to the U.S. government, part of Iran’s government is appointed, independent of any elections. In the Iranian case, however, this aspect of the government is unquestionably the most powerful part, including many important institutions.

The Supreme Leader

As the final decision maker, the Supreme Leader has either direct or indirect control over nearly the entire government because his primary responsibility is to maintain the continued existence of the Islamic State of Iran. To ensure this, the Ayatollah has power over all three branches of government, the military, and even the state-run media. He also has power or influence on virtually every other political institution, the economy, and major policy decisions. In other words then, the Supreme Leader is the undisputed power in the Iranian regime.

The person who spearheaded the 1979 revolution and the first to hold this all important office was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini founded the state and defined his role in it by championing four key characteristics, “justice, independence, self-sufficiency, and Islamic Piety.” Khomeini also offered a religious justification for the office, believing he held the place on earth of a 12th Imam, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammed who has since gone into hiding. Khomeini died in 1989 with no appointed successor.

The man who succeeded him and the current supreme leader of Iran is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei has served in this position since 1989 making him the second longest current ruler in the Middle East. Khamenei was a longtime loyalist to Khomeini and also served two terms as Iran’s president before outmaneuvering rivals for the coveted Supreme Leader position.

The Guardian Council

Next in Iran’s unelected hierarchy is the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council is arguably the most important Iranian institution aside from the Supreme Leader. The council has the final say on legislation passed by the parliament and maintains the ability to determine which candidates are eligible to run for public office in the parliament, presidency, and the Assembly of Experts. There are 12 members, six chosen by the Supreme Leader and six chosen by the judiciary and confirmed by parliament. The members of this group serve six-year terms. This group’s ability to evaluate legislation is part of its role that is similar to the U.S. Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court evaluates laws based on their adherence to the U.S. Constitution, the Guardian Council determines whether laws are compliant with both Iran’s constitution and Islamic law.

The Expediency Council

The Expediency Council serves as advisors to the Supreme Leader, much as the cabinet does to the president. This assembly is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader and consists of highly regarded political, social, and religious authorities. Aside from advising the Supreme Leader, this body’s main responsibility is to act as the final arbiter in disputes between the Parliament and Guardian Council. In 2005, it was also granted sweeping powers by the Supreme Leader over all branches of the government.

The Judiciary

Iran’s judiciary is a multi-tiered system of courts tasked with overseeing the enforcement of the law and settling grievances among Iranian citizens. The Supreme Leader has a considerable amount of control over the judiciary as he appoints its leader, who then appoints the head of the Supreme Court and the top public prosecutor. There are three main branches of the judiciary, the public courts, the revolutionary courts, and the special clerical court. While the public court deals with criminal and civil matters, the latter two courts deal with everything else.

Based the structure of the judiciary and its position beneath the Supreme Leader, many believe that it is often used as a political tool to squash dissent and maintain strict control over the people of Iran. Critics also note that the trial process in Iran is often very opaque and restrictive, allowing greater government influence.

The Revolutionary Guard

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is yet another body whose leadership is appointed by the Supreme Leader, along with the regular army. This group was created following the revolution to defend its key figures and fight its opponents. Unsurprisingly, this group only answers to the Supreme Leader. Aside from being in charge of militia branches in every town in Iran, the Revolutionary Guard has widespread influence throughout Iranian life.

The Revolutionary Guard’s special place both within the military and within Iran itself comes from its initial purpose of serving as an armed body loyal to the revolution as the regular army that had been loyal to the departed Shah. Since its inception, the guard has acquired billions of dollars from a variety of activities such as shipping, construction, defense contracts, and oil production. The group uses many of these assets to fund militant or extremist groups abroad such as Hezbollah. The Revolutionary Guard is so powerful, in fact, that some of the American and E.U. sanctions have targeted the IRGC specifically.

The two other major components of Iran’s defense forces are the army and the ministry of intelligence and security, which is essentially the Iranian CIA. All three of these groups are under the direction of the Supreme National Security Council. While this agency is again tentatively under the control of the president, in reality, the Supreme Leader possesses most of the control.

Elected Officials

Also similar to the United States, a portion of the Iranian government is elected by the people. Anyone over 18, including women, is eligible to vote. Also like in the American system, the different branches have some checks on one another.

The President and Cabinet

The presidency in Iran shares some of the characteristics of the same position in the United States. Namely, the presidential term is four years, and a president can only be elected for two consecutive terms. However, while the president, in theory, is the second most powerful person in Iran behind the supreme leader, reality suggests that the office’s power is drastically curtailed by unelected leaders. Not only does the president answer to the Guardian Council, which chooses who can run for the position in the first place, but the Supreme Leader retains final authority over most major political decisions. In fact, the President of Iran is the only executive in the world to not have control over the country’s military.

Parliament

Iran’s parliament has 290 members and is similar to most western legislatures. Notably, this body has its membership determined through popular elections. Once elected, members have the power to introduce and pass laws as well as summon and impeach cabinet ministers and the president. Once again, though, Parliament’s power and even who is eligible to run for office is determined by the Guardian Council. Unlike in the United States, the Iranian legislature is a unicameral body whose members serve four-year terms. The Iranian parliament’s sessions and its minutes are open to the public.

Assembly of Experts

The final part of Iran’s leadership that is directly elected is the Assembly of Experts. There are 86 members of this body and each one is elected to an eight-year term. To be considered, each member must be a cleric or religious leader. This group has the critical responsibility of appointing and subsequently monitoring the Supreme Leader. Members of this group are vetted first by the Guardian Council, the primary check on its influence. This group meets for only one week each year and although it has the power to depose the Supreme Leader it has never challenged any of his decisions since the Islamic Republic of Iran formed. The accompanying video gives a concise explanation of how the Iranian government is organized:

Major Challenges Facing Iran’s Leadership

Domestic Dissent

Protests in Iran became particularly significant in the 20th century, as Iranian citizens frequently spoke out against the government. For the first half of the century, this was aimed at the decadent dynastic government and later colonial masters. The resistance then focused on the Shah, which eventually led to the Iranian Revolution. Following the revolution, discontent emerged in 2009 when people took to the streets to dispute then President Ahmadinejad’s reelection. In 2011, another flare-up of protests occurred concurrently with the Arab Spring revolts in nearby countries. Much of the protest again focused on the contentious 2009 elections and were led by the Green Movement.

International Relations

Political decisions in Iran are often the result of a complex process that is typically driven by the Supreme Leader. Given the nature of the Iranian government, several international concerns have significant implications for the country and how its government responds.

Possibly the most pressing concern facing Iran is its proxy war with Saudi Arabia. The two countries have effectively positioned themselves as the defenders and standard bearers of Islam, but champion different denominations. This is especially true of the Supreme Leader who feels it is his mission to lead Islam and who also views Saudi Arabia as an obstacle in the way of that. This proxy conflict threatens to turn into more direct action if Iran reneges on its nuclear deal. The video below details the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia:

The recent nuclear deal between Iran and the United States brings up another important challenge for the country. While the two groups have worked together to finalize the deal, a conflict remains. Aside from the history of distrust between both countries, Iran’s support for a number of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas–which are considered terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department–and its anti-Israel policy remain hurdles.

Conclusion

Iran has a large and complex leadership structure, which originated in the aftermath of the revolution in 1979. On one hand are democratic institutions such as the president and parliament, which are similar to American and Western models. On the other are a series of appointed offices that wield a significant portion of political power in the country. At the heart of this system lies the Supreme Leader who has control over many of the appointments and final say over virtually all of the country’s affairs. This system itself is a reaction to the previous secular regime of the Shah, which was founded upon a greater emphasis on Islamic law as well as inherent animosity toward the United States.

Iran is a mixture of theocracy and democracy, and understanding how Iran is governed and run is critical to understanding how to effectively deal with it. As history has shown, many countries, particularly the United States, have misinterpreted or misjudged the nation’s leadership.

Resources

The New York Times: 1979: Iran’s Islamic Revolution

United States Institute of Peace: The Supreme Leader

BBC News: Guide: How Iran is Ruled

Your Middle East: Iran’s Century of Protest

Global Security.org: Pasdaran: Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The Guardian: Iran Protests See Reinvigorated Activists Take to the Streets in Thousands

Politico: The Hidden Consequences of the Oil Crash

The New York Times: U.S. and Iran Both Conflict and Converge

Encyclopedia Britannica: Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi

United States Institute of Peace: The Oil and Gas Industry

PBS: The Structure of Power in Iran

Michael Sliwinski

Michael Sliwinski (@MoneyMike4289) is a 2011 graduate of Ohio University in Athens with a Bachelor’s in History, as well as a 2014 graduate of the University of Georgia with a Master’s in International Policy. In his free time he enjoys writing, reading, and outdoor activites, particularly basketball. Contact Michael at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Iran’s Leadership: Inside the Complex Regime appeared first on Law Street.

Early last week the Bureau of Justice Statistics revealed that for the first time since 1980 the federal prison population in the United States has dropped. In the last year alone, the federal prison population decreased by roughly 4,800. With new counts projecting the number of federal inmates to continue to fall by just over 2,000 in the next 12 months and by nearly 10,000 the year after, I ask the questions how, why, and what effect will this change have?

Over the past few years the Justice Department has revealed that crime rates have been dropping. Earlier this year, Attorney General Eric Holder aimed to change policies to reflect the belief that increasing the number of people behind bars does nothing to improve public safety. An example of such policies includes The Smarter Sentencing Act — which essentially seeks to eliminate mandatory minimum sentencing for defendants found guilty of first-time drug offenses — and the more recent Clemency Act, which seeks to release offenders from prison who were unfairly sentenced by mandatory sentencing guidelines. Holder has worked in the last year to reduce a prison population he says is costly and bloated. He was not wrong: in 2014 the country spent approximately $60 billion to incarcerate offenders.

Even as someone who has completed a masters in criminal justice, including a core required course in statistical management (which let’s be honest, was as horrific as it sounds), I still struggle to understand the relevance of the numbers the media is throwing at us. I agree that it is a real achievement that fewer people are being sentenced to time in prison, but I really want society to understand why it is such an achievement, and what this really means.

The decrease in prison population is certainly an incredible start to the potential success of community supervision and its benefits. The one thing these articles fail to point out is just how much further we have to go to protect us as a society, and those who enter into the system. You may be thinking at this point that I am out of my mind for considering the safety and well being of convicted offenders; however, the majority of individuals arrested and convicted are non-violent drug offenders. What the article praising the decrease in the prison population failed to acknowledge is that although certain convicted offenders will not be sentenced to prison, the conditions of their sentence lived in society carry a higher risk of future incarceration than if they were placed behind bars in the first place.

Just because these individuals are not physically locked behind bars does not mean they are not locked behind the transparent bars of social isolation. Rates of unemployment, difficulty securing housing, and loss of family are just some of the hurdles most of these individuals  contend with. Why? Because they have been stigmatized by society with their criminal label. Virtually everyone on community supervision is at risk of being detained or incarcerated upon failure to comply with the conditions of supervision. Would you be able to follow a list of conditions if you felt like no one supported you? In order to support alternatives to incarceration, we really need to welcome the culture of supervision and understand the positives it can bring us. Not only will we be spending less money on the safekeeping of these individuals, but intervention and supervision can be accurately given to each offender to prevent re-offenses, interrupt the cycle of crime in families, and shake up the social disorganization within communities.

Regardless of whether you believe crime is a choice, crime is inherited, or crime is learned, the solid facts are that crime happens. By locking individuals up without any guidance, or even attempting to work on understanding the cause, the likelihood of reoffending is just as high if not worse than it was before that person was put in jail. Legislators clearly have been able to understand the reality that sending people to prison does nothing for public safety, so now it is time they invest money into supervision agencies to aid offenders in the right way. In order for this to happen, well-trained staff, evidence-based programs, and support from others is essential.

It is essential we maintain a safe environment for everyone in our communities. The notable decrease in the overall American incarceration and crime rates is something that hasn’t happened in more than 40 years. This hopefully marks the start of a revolutionary change for the U.S. criminal justice system.

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Hannah Kaye (@HannahSKaye) is originally from London, now living in New York. Recently graduated with an MA in criminal justice from John Jay College. Strong contenders for things she is most passionate about are bagels and cupcakes.

Featured image courtesy of [Viewminder via Flickr]

Hannah Kaye

Hannah Kaye is originally from London, now living in New York. Recently graduated with an MA in criminal justice from John Jay College. Strong contenders for things she is most passionate about are bagels and cupcakes. Contact Hannah at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Incarceration Figures Drop, But Community Support is Essential to Public Safety appeared first on Law Street.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi won the Egyptian presidential election last Wednesday with 96 percent of the vote, according to Aljazeera. This landslide comes as no surprise, since Egypt’s largest media outlets — namely Egypt’s largest state-owned newspaper, Al Gomhuria, and Al Kahera Wal Nas TV Network — have backed El-Sisi since July 2013 when, as Minister of Defense, he led the ousting of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi. Nonetheless, El-Sisi’s election does not change much in Egypt as repressive authoritarian policies, instituted after the ousting of Morsi, continue to plague the Egyptian people.

One measure, proposed in November 2013, banned “abusive graffiti” on buildings in Egypt, and organized government committees in cities to monitor political street art. Violators could end up with four years in prison or EGP 100,000 in fines, according to Egyptian Independent. On the road to Democracy, El-Sisi has promised to restore stability to the State, vowing to “care for the interests of the people,” and build a stronger Egypt. Apparently this means arresting and executing political dissidents, maintaining a tight state-propaganda machine, and setting loose the military as a police force among the Egyptian people. But banning graffiti?

Since 2011, protests swelled into riots that would topple former President Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian graffiti has surged. “Almost every event that happened was mirrored on the streets with art,” according to Basama Hamdy, co-author Walls of Freedom, which chronicles the rise of political graffiti since January 25, 2011. It was the “people’s newspaper,” said Hamdy, with a subversive edge. “Some messages were really dangerous,” said co-author and German graffiti artist Don “Stone” Karl, “they told stories that the state, the military or the police wanted to cover up…Graffiti was never more powerful as it is in Egypt today…Where have you seen mothers cry in front of the graffiti murals of their sons? Where have you seen men pray in front of the portraits of their friends?” Graffiti art has since become a devisive political weapon, and a key target for El-Sisi’s repressive regime.

Graffiti artist Mohamed Fahmy, who goes by the name Ganzeer, is the face of El-Sisi’s recent crackdown on political graffiti. On May 9, 2014, Egyptian news anchor Osama Kamal on his show Al Raees Wel Nas (“The President and The People”) labeled the artist a “terrorist” supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is a serious accusation since the El-Sisi regime sentenced ten Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death last Saturday for inciting violence and political protest. Ganzeer, who was arrested for this political art in 2011, is now in hiding, although he and his cohorts, Finnish street artist Sampsa and the German-based art collective Captain Borderline, refuse to be silenced. In the summer of 2013, Sampsa and Ganzeer collaborated on a poster critiquing aggressive military crackdowns ordered by El-Sisi, then Minister of Defense; “The Army Above All” depicts a bloodthirsty soldier standing triumphant.

“Ganzeer” courtesy of Gigi Ibrahim via Flickr

Sampsa and Ganzeer have used social media, particularly the hashtag #SisiWarCrimes, to publicize their graffiti and call attention to military abuses. On August 14, 2013, news broke of the worst mass killing in modern Egyptian history, during the military suppression of encampments of pro-Morsi supporters. “We sat watching YouTube clips of Egyptians getting murdered,” Sampsa recalled. “What Sisi needs to begin to understand is that a larger audience is now watching his every move.”

Egyptian street artists like Ganzeer and Sampsa see “a clear progression in Sisi’s silencing of opposition from the NGOs, the Muslim Brotherhood, the youth movement, non-compliant journalists,” writes Bob Duggan of Bigthink.com, “and now, at the bottom of the food chain, street artists.” It is a disgrace that artists would be targeted in such a “Stalin-ish way,” Sampsa exclaimed. “This is the democracy that Sisi is offering in Egypt — absolute rule — absolute oppression of dissent.” In a blog post responding to the recent defamation, Ganzeer sees political graffiti as a source of information to the State, rather than a threat: “By paying attention to what we do, perhaps the State can better understand popular grievances and adjust its policies and governance accordingly, rather than invest so many resources into trying to shut us up.”

As El-Sisi assumes the presidency, though, we can expect more of the same repressive tactics used against the Egyptian people; the military will continue to arrest, and execute political dissidents, while State propaganda will discredit and censor contrarian voices in media. It is much more difficult, however, to control the decentralized protest of graffiti artists. “People forget that the streets belong to the people,” said Ganzeer in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor. “They think that they’re some kind of official government-controlled entity. I think it’s important to remind people that they’re not.” Going forward, political graffiti will remain a voice of democracy in Egypt.

Ryan Purcell

Ryan D. Purcell holds an MA in American History from Rutgers University where he explored the intersection between hip hop graffiti writers and art collectives on the Lower East Side. His research is based on experience working with the Newark Public Arts Project and from tagging independently throughout New Jersey and New York. Contact Ryan at staff@LawStreetMedia.com.

The post Defining Egyptian Democracy Through Graffiti appeared first on Law Street.

In a recent article, Three-month ban on Skype, Viber, and Whatsapp in Sindh Proposed published by Pakistan Today, Provincial Information Minister Sharjeel Memon stated,“terrorists and criminal elements are using these networks to communicate after the targeted operation was launched.” These comments were a reflection on the media ban that took place in the Sindh province of Pakistan on Thursday, October 3rd. Over a year before this most recent ban, Youtube was also expelled from all of Pakistan after a musical group criticizing the Pakistani government made it big on the social media platform. Other forms of social media have also often been chastised for lending to unorthodox muslim ideas about reform and government separation. The domination of Islam, already prevalent, is now infringing even more into public policy and the government of the nation.

In comparison, the Facebook ban in China has not stopped the Chinese from using it and the Pakistani Youtube suppression has not fully restricted the Pakistanis; it is only more challenging to access these sites. These bans do not limit everyone in the nation, just a specific demographic. Obviously, those of high socioeconomic standing or those who possess web knowledge will be able to bypass the system. It is the general middle class populace that gets affected by these bans the most. The purpose of controlling the social media networks, the Pakistani government claims, is to limit terrorist communications. If the Youtube ban from last year still allows use, the ban on social media websites is certainly not going to restrict a group of people who have access to much higher leveled technological resources. In 2011, Osama Bin Laden was found (and killed) in close proximity to a Kabul military base, highlighting the corruption of Pakistan. The question about whether Pakistan was involved with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations compares to the question, “did O.J. murder his wife, Nicole?”. It is hard to believe that this sort of limitation will restrain the terrorist groups from communicating, if that is what the government actually wants. What, then, does the government want from this ban?

Moving our concentration a little west, Saudi Arabia is one of the most censored countries in the world. The news, although privatized, is still regulated by the government, as heads of the stations are appointed by the government. The content of the news distributed is also heavily regulated. A 2011 governmental decree forbade media from reporting anything that countered Sharia law or anything of “foreign interests and  that undermines national security,” Saudi Arabian King Abdullah stated. Is this what the future holds for Pakistan?

The role of social media has developed into something ineffable and so ingrained into culture. Larger than life, it led the on-going revolution in Egypt, connecting people with local and public information. What’s going on? What should we do? How do we do it? — these questions were asked and answered by the Egyptian locals, creating a large-scale community of people seeking change. The revolution reflected on the power social media holds. Realizing this, in a failed attempt to stop the riots, the Egyptian government blocked the social media sites and mobile phone networks, taking away full internet access. The result was only more anger from the public. Perhaps, Pakistan is trying to learn from Egypt’s mistake by blinding their people before they widen their eyes and realize the full potential of their tools.

As of now the social media prohibition in Sindh is suppose to last three months to limit terrorist communication. Recent history and personal speculation leads me to believe otherwise.

[pakistantoday] [France24]

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Featured image courtesy of [Jason Howle via Flickr]

Vasudha Sadana

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