There’s a joke going around online that makes fun of one of the dominant explanations for Donald Trump’s rise in American politics. You’ll see it a lot on social media: people will take a news story depicting what can only be described as racism, and then joke about how economic anxiety explains support for Trump when clearly it’s not related.

Here’s a good, relatively mild joke about the Confederate flag from Jamelle Bouie, a writer for Slate:

Just some Trump supporters, waving the flag of economic anxiety. https://t.co/6RlnATpvSK

— Jamelle Bouie (@jbouie) July 26, 2016

The joke here is, of course, that a lot of Donald Trump’s support has little to do with an individual’s economic circumstances. Shortly after Trump started rising in the polls during the Republican primary, the “economic anxiety hypothesis” was a dominant explanation for his success. Trump, the theory goes, speaks to those who have been left behind by globalization and free trade. And to an extent, that explanation makes sense–Trump constantly trashes “bad trade deals,” threatens companies that want to move jobs overseas, and claims that his economic agenda will focus on bringing manufacturing jobs back to the United States.

But over time, it has become pretty clear that economics can only explain so much of Trump’s support, so something else must to be at play too. So what, then, explains the rise of populism not just in the United States, but also in many countries in Western Europe? With Trump’s rise in American politics, Brexit in the United Kindom, and growing anti-immigrant sentiment growing as Europe’s refugee crisis surges, answering this question is more important than ever. Is it simply racism or is there more to it than that?

As it turns out, we have some new research that takes a look at that question specifically. Professors Ronald Inglehart from the University of Michigan and Pippa Norris from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government took a systematic look at two hypothesis–the economic insecurity and cultural backlash hypotheses–in their recent working paper to see what’s really going on.

Identifying the Rise of Populism

While their research focuses primarily on the rise of populism in Western Europe, they argue that the developments in Europe can help inform what is going on in American politics today. In their research, Inglehart and Norris identify populist parties in Europe, track their rise in many countries, and look at what factors led voters to support them.

Inglehart and Norris identify several patterns that illustrate and help explain the rise of populism in Western Europe over the past several decades. First, and most obviously, more votes were cast for populist parties, causing their representation in governments to increase. Candidates in populist parties on the right and left of the economic spectrum increased dramatically from the 1960s to the 2010s. Vote share for parties on the populist right rose from 6.7 percent in the 1960s to 13.4 percent in the 2010s, according to ParlGov data, which tracks voting patterns in many western democracies. Similarly, vote share for populist left parties rose from 2.4 percent in the 1960s to 12.7 in the 2010s. They also note that over time, cultural issues have become much more important to political parties than economic ones have.

What’s unique about the researchers’ analysis is their use of a cultural dimension to locate different parties on an ideological spectrum. Most people are familiar with the traditional left and right dimension, where right is conservative and left is liberal. But Inglehart and Norris build on that to argue that the traditional spectrum really only applies to economic issues, while a new axis should be added to capture how people divide on cultural issues. On this vertical axis, they put liberal cosmopolitanism at the bottom and populism at the top. In doing so, they acknowledge that populism has more to do with cultural values and that populist parties can pop up on both the right and left of the economic spectrum.

Defining Populism

Now, without diving too much into the jargon, it’s important to look at how the researchers define populism and its inverse, cosmopolitan liberalism. The researchers draw from past research to summarize populism as having three distinct characteristics: anti-establishment sentiment, authoritarianism, and nativism. Because populism can emerge on both the right and left sides of the economic spectrum, it’s helpful to think about it in terms of the values that stay constant, which are largely cultural. They conclude:

Populism favors mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over international cooperation and development aid, closed borders over the free flow of peoples, ideas, labor and capital, and traditionalism over progressive and liberal social values.

Cosmopolitan liberalism, on the other side of the spectrum, is essentially the opposite of that–favoring open borders, shared values, and diversity. Importantly, the researchers go on to note, “Social liberalism is also linked with support for equal rights for women and minorities, flexible rather than fixed gender roles, fluid gender identities and LGBT rights, environmental protection, and secular rather than religious values.” And with that, you have the crux of the cultural backlash hypothesis; as the issues that define cosmopolitan liberalism have taken hold in the West, populist parties may be popping up as a result.

After analyzing polling data, the researchers concluded that the cultural backlash hypothesis appears to explain the rise of populism more so than economic circumstances or perceived economic insecurity. They found a connection between different demographic characteristics, notably age and education levels, that was associated with voting for populist parties, but when you combine those demographics with cultural values, a clear fit exists. And while there was some overlap between economic insecurity and populist voting, culture appears to play a stronger role. They conclude, “The electoral success of [populist] parties at the ballot box can be attributed mainly to their ideological and issue appeals to traditional values.”

What Does it Tell Us About Trump?

Inglehart and Norris use culture to explain what happened over the past several years in many western European countries and go on to say that the same thing is likely underway in the United States. Populism in America appears to be following a similar trajectory, and if you look at the base of Donald Trump’s support you will see a similar group of values and demographics. As more evidence piles up to challenge the economic anxiety explanation, it’s important to look at how cultural views shape support for populists.

And yes, race or racial resentment likely plays into this as well. If you doubt that connection then you should watch this video from the New York Times showing the presence of hate at Trump rallies. But it’s too simplistic to just chalk things up to racism. As Brian Beutler at the New Republic points out, Trump has millions of supporters–probably somewhere around 40 to 45 percent of the American electorate–so assuming that they all plan to vote for him because they’re all racist is a stretch. But you’d also be ignoring a lot about Trump’s campaign over the past year or so to say that race hasn’t played a role.

As the West continues to move in a liberal cosmopolitan direction, there will be large swaths of people who lash out at social change through support for populist parties and candidates. In Europe, this backlash has been more pronounced as proportionally representative parliamentary systems make it easier for new parties to earn seats in government, but it’s clear that the United States is not immune.

These findings may be discouraging for many. After all, those who pushed for progress on issues like gay marriage and immigration didn’t anticipate Donald Trump in response. But understanding this pattern is important. Inglehart and Norris conclude: “The net result is that Western societies face more unpredictable contests, anti-establishment populist challenges to the legitimacy of liberal democracy, and potential disruptions to long-established patterns of party competition.” These challenges are real, and they probably aren’t going away anytime soon.

Kevin Rizzo

Kevin Rizzo is the Crime in America Editor at Law Street Media. An Ohio Native, the George Washington University graduate is a founding member of the company. Contact Kevin at krizzo@LawStreetMedia.com.

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